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UNIVERSITY  OF  MARYLAND 
Recent  Trends  in  U.S.  Earnings 
and  Family  Incomes 
1. Introduction 
In his recent survey of economic growth, Angus Maddison (1987) referred 
to "the postwar golden  age which ended  in 1973 ...  (p. 649)." Maddison 
was discussing  the growth of GDP but his description applies equally well 
to the growth  of individual  incomes.  Since 1973, industrialized  countries 
have  faced  the  income  losses  of two  oil price shocks  and  experienced 
sharp slowdowns  in the  growth  of multi-factor and labor productivity. 
The  impact  of  these  events  can  be  understood  by  considering  the 
stylized  frontier that describes  the  point-in-time  trade-off between  the 
growth  rate of employment  and the growth  of the marginal product  of 
labor (Figure  1).  For most  countries,  the  decline  in labor productivity 
growth  shifted  the  frontier inward.  The oil price shocks  had a similar, 
but more  episodic,  effect  by raising  import  prices and  so reducing  the 
purchasing  power  of the product wage. 
Different  countries  dealt with  their newly  restricted choices  in differ- 
ent  ways.  Many  European  economies  continued  to  enjoy  real  wage 
growth  at the  cost  of  historically  high  unemployment  (Blanchard and 
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Figure  1 THE  TRADE-OFF  BETWEEN  THE  GROWTH  RATE  OF 
EMPLOYMENT  AND THE  GROWTH  RATE  OF LABOR'S 
MARGINAL  PRODUCT 
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Summers  1986; and Lawrence  and Schultze  1987). In the United States, 
civilian employment  increased  by 24.5 million persons  (+29%) between 
1973 and 1986 but at the cost of very low real wage  growth.2 In the U.S., 
moreover, general wage  stagnation was accompanied by greater inequal- 
ity in annual earnings  for men (but not for women)  and greater inequal- 
ity in family incomes. 
The combined  effect of stagnant wages  and greater inequality on U.S. 
men's earnings is displayed  in Figure 2 which compares annual earnings 
distributions  of prime age men (ages 25-55)  for 1973 and 1986. The data, 
taken from the Current Population  Survey (CPS), refer to pre-tax money 
earnings  (the  CPS  records  neither  taxes  nor  fringe  benefits)  and  the 
sample  consists  of men who  worked  at least one hour during the year.3 
2. The reader may ask whether  the increase in U.S.  employment  is, by itself, sufficient  to 
explain low  wage  growth  without  appeal  to the restricted frontier of Figure 1. I discuss 
this question  in Section 2. 
3. For purposes  of this paper, earnings  are defined  as the sum of CPS items measuring  an 
individual's  wage  and salary income,  self-employment  income and farm income.  Where 
this sum  is negative  (reflecting  business  losses  among  the self-employed),  it has been 
arbitrarily reset to $1.00. Recent  Trends  in U.S. Earnings  and  Family  Incomes  ' 75 
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Figure  2 EARNINGS  OF 25-55-YEAR-OLD  MEN: 1973, 1986 (MEN AGE  25-34 
WITH  12 OR FEWER  YEARS  OF EDUCATION  SHOWN  IN SUB- 
BARS) 
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Earnings  in 1987  dollars.  Inflation-adjusted  using PCE  Index. 
The  data,  like  all  other  income  data  in  this  paper,  are  expressed  in  1987 
dollars  using  the  implicit  Personal  Consumption  Expenditure  Deflator  of 
the  Gross  National  Product  Accounts. 
Had  real wages  grown  at,  say, 2% per year  after  1973,  the  1986 distribu- 
tion  in  Figure  2 would  have  been  centered  in  the  $30-$40,000  range.4  In 
the  absence  of  such  growth,  the  1973  and  1986  distributions  overlap  to a 
substantial  degree  and  the  overlap  facilitates  intertemporal  comparisons. 
When  1973  and  1986  are  compared,  the  proportion  of  men  earning  less 
than  $20,000  and  earning  more  than  $50,000  have  both  increased  while 
the  proportion  of  men  earning  $20-$50,000  has  declined.  In  the  lan- 
guage  of popular  debate,  these  changes  in  the  distribution  of male  earn- 
ings  are  consistent  with  either  of  two  meanings  of  vanishing  middle 
class  jobs:  an  increased  inequality  of earnings  (resulting  in a distribution 
with  a smaller  middle  class),  and  a declining  proportion  of workers  who 
4. For example, in the 13 years from 1960 to 1973, labor productivity  in the non-farm 
business sector grew at an average  2.4%  per year and the median  individual  income of 
all men who worked year-round  and full-time  increased  from  $19,638  to $27,490  (in 1987 
dollars) (+40%) (Bureau  of the Census, 1987b).  The conjectural  2% figure in the text 
reflects the fact that under the best of conditions, the growth of output per worker 
would have been depressed by the entrance of the baby boom cohorts into the labor 
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earn enough  to support  a middle  class  standard  of living-e.g.,  above 
$20,000.5 
Figure 3 compares  the 1973 and 1986 annual earnings  distributions  of 
prime age women  (ages 25-55).  Here, a quite different picture emerges. 
Women's  annual  earnings  lie well  below  mens',  but between  1973 and 
1986, the  proportion  of women  earning  less  than $10,000 has  declined 
substantially  while  the proportion  earning between  $20 and $50,000 has 
increased. 
A number  of popular  articles have  drawn  direct links between  shifts 
over  time  in  the  real earnings  distribution  and  the  movement  of labor 
between  middle  class,  or "good jobs" (high  wage  jobs) and  "bad jobs" 
(low wage  jobs).6 A moment's  reflection  suggests  several other reasons 
why  real earnings  distributions  may shift: changes  in the age/education 
composition  of the population,  changes  in the number of hours worked, 
changes  in cohort  size.  Further, all of these  factors operate in a context 
established  by  the  underlying  growth  of  productivity  and  macroeco- 
nomic shocks. 
Figure 4 compares  the  1973 and  1986 family income  distribution.  The 
Census  defines  a  "family" as  two  or more  persons  related  by  blood, 
marriage,  or  adoption.  Persons  who  live  alone  or  cohabit  with  non- 
relatives are excluded  from the distribution.7 The resulting family distri- 
bution  depends  in part on individual  earnings  and in part on the num- 
ber of earners  per family, as well  as the distribution  of income  sources 
other  than  earnings  including  interest,  dividends,  rents,  private  pen- 
sions,  and  government  pensions  and  transfer payments.  (Note,  how- 
ever, that the CPS does  not record income  from capital gains.) 
In the family income  distribution,  as in the distribution  of prime-age 
male annual earnings,  there has been little real growth between  1973 and 
1986. Over the period,  median  family income  increased  from $28,890 to 
$30,670 (5% per decade),  a far slower rate than in earlier decades.8 And as 
5. The  debate  was  prominent  in  the  1988 presidential  campaign  and  included  Michael 
Dukakis' references  to "good jobs at good wages" and "two-paycheck prosperity," Rich- 
ard Gephardt's  commercial  featuring  the  "$48,000 K-Car," Jesse Jackson's speeches  on 
the  victims  of  "economic  violence"  and  Pat Robertson's  speeches  to  South  Carolina 
textile workers  in which  he argued  that their industry  was being destroyed  by interna- 
tional bankers. 
6. These articles are referenced  in Section 3. 
7. In Census  statistics,  these  persons  are included  in  a separate  income  distribution  of 
"unrelated individuals." 
8. These  figures  are from the U.S.  Bureau of the Census  (1987b) but they are adjusted  by 
the  implicit  PCE deflator  rather  than  the  Consumer  Price Index  (CPI) used  by  the 
Census.  CPI adjustment  would  show  median family income declining  by 1% per decade. 
I discuss  family income  growth  in Section 5. Recent Trends  in U.S. Earnings  and Family Incomes  ?  77 
in the  distribution  of male  earnings,  stagnation  of family incomes  was 
accompanied by greater income inequality. During the period, the propor- 
tions  of  families  with  incomes  below  $10,000  and  above  $50,000 both 
increased  moderately  while  the proportions  of families with incomes  be- 
tween  $10,000 and $50,000 declined  moderately. 
In this  paper,  I review  recent  trends  in the  level  and  distribution  of 
individual  earnings  and  family  incomes  in  the  United  States.  The re- 
mainder of the paper is divided  into six sections.  In Section 2, I review 
the  trend  in individual  incomes  for the  post-World War II period.  The 
trend  is  one  of  significant  income  growth  through  1973 followed  by 
very  slow  growth  (i.e.,  stagnation)  thereafter.  I discuss  some  of  the 
implications  of the transition  from growth  to stagnation  for U.S. life. In 
Section  3,  I examine  detailed  post-1973  wage  and  earnings  trends  for 
selected  demographic  groups  to see  why  some  groups'  earnings  grew 
faster  than  the  underlying  trend  while  other  group's  earnings  grew 
more  slowly.  Much  of the  growing  "lower tail" in Figure 2 reflects the 
declining  earnings  of young,  less  educated  men.  By contrast,  some  of 
the  upward  shift  in  Figure  3 reflects  higher  hourly  wages  for college 
educated  women.  I  propose  an  explanation  of  these  trends  based 
Figure 3 EARNINGS  DISTRIBUTION  OF WOMEN  (EARNINGS  IN 1973  AND 
1986;  WOMEN  25-45 WITH  4 YEARS  COLLEGE  SHOWN  IN SUB- 
BARS) 
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largely  on  shifts  in  the  demand  for different  kinds  of labor. Together, 
the detailed  statistics and the explanation  help clarify the good jobs-bad 
jobs debate. 
In Section  4, I briefly sketch how  the nation  managed  to increase per 
capita income,  a traditional  measure  of living  standards,  even  as earn- 
ings stagnated. 
In Section 5, I review recent changes  in the family income distribution. 
Family income  inequality  has  increased  to a degree  but equally  impor- 
tant are movements  of various  groups  within the distribution.  In a con- 
text of slow  family income  growth and moderately  increasing inequality, 
the position  of elderly families has improved  significantly while the posi- 
tion of the poorest  one-third  of children has declined  sharply. 
In Section 6, I examine  parts of the process by which changes  in men's 
earnings  inequality  are transformed  into  changes  in family income  in- 
equality. The complete  transformation is complex and depends  upon the 
distribution  of unearned  income,  the propensity  to marry, the propen- 
sity of married men  to have  working  spouses,  and the relationship  be- 
tween  low  male  wages  and  the  formation  of female-headed  families.  I 
present  some  rough calculations  on the first three items in this list. 
Section  7 contains  a short  conclusion  and  some  speculations  on  the 
future. 
Figure  4 DISTRIBUTION  OF FAMILIES  BY  INCOME  1973, 1986 
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2. Earnings  Growth  and Stagnation. 
A standard analytical tool in labor economics  is the age-earnings  profile, 
the relationship  between  earnings  and age in a cross-sectional  sample. 
The profile shows  how  earnings  change  with increased  experience.  But 
as a man  or woman  actually  ages,  changes  in earnings  will  arise from 
two  general  effects.  The  first is the  movement  along  the  age-earnings 
profile,  the  effect  of  increased  experience.  The  second  is  the  effect  of 
changes  in  the  economy's  real wage  scale  which  can move  the  entire 
age-earnings  profile up or down. 
In periods  of strong real wage growth,  the second effect dominates  the 
first through  much  of a man's  career. Consider  the cohort of men  who 
were  35-44  in  1949 (Figure 5).  The CPS reports  the median  income  of 
Figure  5 THE  GROWTH  OF MEN'S  EARNINGS  OVER  TIME  (1987  DOLLARS) 
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Table  1  THE  STAGNATION  OF WORKERS'  INCOMES  AFTER  1973 
(1987  DOLLARS) 
Their  average  income  Growth  in the 
at age 50  income  scale over 
Men  who  (Full-Time  Workers  Only)  the previous decade  Men  who 
were  50 in:  Census  Adjusted  Census  Adjusted 
1946*  $15,257  $15,529  - 
1956  $18,558  $19,208  21.6%  23.7% 
1966  $23,971  $25,168  29.2%  31.0% 
(1973)  ($30,578)  ($32,701)  **  ** 
1976  $30,179  $32,752  25.9%  30.1% 
1986  $32,960  $36,228  9.2%  10.6% 
*1946 is used  as a starting point because  it is when  the first published  data were available. 
**As noted  in the text, the process  of deep  stagnation  began at the end of 1973 with the first OPEC oil 
price shock.  The growth  rate of incomes  between  1973 and 1987 on a per decade  basis was 5.9% (Census) 
and 8.2% (Adjusted). 
Source:  Income statistics from U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  Current  Population  Reports,  Series P-60, various 
issues.  Income  for adjustments  from  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau of  Economic  Analysis, 
National Income  and Product Accounts, various issues.  "Average Income of men at 50, Full-Time Workers 
Only" refers to the median  income  of all male year-round,  full-time workers, ages 45-54.  Conversion  to 
1987 dollars made using  the Personal Consumption  Expenditure Index. 
these men to be $13,706 (in 1987 dollars) while the median income of 45- 
54-year-old men in the same year was $12,777 (in 1987 dollars). In terms 
of pure experience  effects,  the cohort of 35-44-year-old men should  have 
seen  little real income  gain  over  the next  decade.  But when  the cohort 
actually reached  ages  45-54  (in 1959) their median  income  was  $17,860 
(+30%),  the result of a rising real wage  structure.9 
We can  approximate  the  real  wage  scale  by  following  an  earnings 
benchmark  over  time-the  median  annual  income  of  45-54-year-old 
men who  worked  year-round  and full-time (Table 1) as tabulated by the 
CPS.  By  1987,  the  oldest  baby-boomers  (born  in  1946)  had  not  yet 
turned  45; so  earnings  of men  in the 45-54-year-old age  range were  at 
least  partially protected  from big changes  in cohort  size.10 By focusing 
on men  who  work  year-round  and  full-time,  we  can isolate  the effects 
9. In practice, the age-earnings  profile for more educated  workers keeps  rising even  after 
the profile for less  educated  workers  has turned  down.  It follows  that a small part of 
the  increase  in  the  example  reflects  the  fact that the  cohort of 35-44-year-old  men  in 
1949 had higher average  education  than the cohort ten years older. 
10. The protection  is only  partial because  of the potential  substitution  between  older and 
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of  rising  real wages  while  reducing  the  big  income  variations  due  to 
changing  unemployment.1 
The  benchmark  has  two  problems.  The  CPS  did  not  cross-classify 
incomes  by education  in the 1950s and 1960s and so some of the bench- 
mark's growth  will reflect the rising educational  levels  of 45-54-year-old 
men  rather than  a rising  (or falling) wage  scale."2  And  as noted  earlier, 
the  CPS  measures  only  income  while  it  excludes  the  value  of  fringe 
benefits.  In recent years,  fringe benefits  have become  an increasing por- 
tion of compensation  and for this reason,  Table 1 contains two columns: 
income  as  published  by  the  Census  and  Census  income  figures  with 
approximate adjustments  for fringe benefits.'3 
From 1950 to 1973, GDP per hour of work (labor productivity) grew at 
an  average  annual  rate of  2.5% and  provided  the  basis  for real wage 
growth.  In 1946 the average  50-year-old  man working  full-time had in- 
come of $15,257 (Table 1). This benchmark rose steadily  so that by 1973, 
the year that ended  with  the first OPEC oil price shock,  the average 50- 
year-old man working  full-time had income  of $30,578. 
A small part of this growth reflected the increased education  of 45-54- 
year-old men.  Another  small part reflected the movement  of men out of 
"bad" jobs-particularly  low  wage  agricultural jobs-and  into  "good" 
jobs.  But the gains  in Table 1 were  largely a macroeconomic  phenome- 
non  that  affected  most  occupations.  For example,  in  1969, white  men 
who  worked  as "Craftsmen and Precision Workers" had mean earnings 
of $22,398,  16% above the real mean earnings of white men who worked 
as  "Executives,  Administrators,  and  Managers"  in  1949 (Levy  1988a, 
Table 7.2). 
At the end of 1973, the first oil price shock led immediately  to unanti- 
cipated  inflation  and  recession  in  the  U.S.  and  by  1975,  the  Census 
benchmark  had fallen by about 3%.14  More important,  1973 marked the 
11. CPS  volumes in the 1950s  and 1960s  did not contain  detailed  earnings  data  and so Table 
1 is based on individual  incomes  (which include interest  and dividends, unemployment 
compensation,  etc.). Among middle aged men who work  year-round  full-time,  median 
income is a reasonably  good approximation  of median  earnings. 
12. I use the term rising wage scale to describe  a situation  in which workers  with a given 
set of demographic  characteristics  are paid a higher hourly  compensation  than similar 
workers  earned at an earlier  time. 
13. These corrections  are made by inflating  Census estimates  of median  individual  income 
by the ratio  of Other  Labor  Income (which includes employer  contributions  for private 
fringe benefits) to Wage and Salary Income where both figures are taken from the 
National  Income  and Product  Accounts. 
14. Median incomes for all 50-year-old  men (as distinct from full-time  workers)  fell more 
sharply  because unemployment  rose sharply  in the 1974-75  recession. 82 *  LEVY 
beginning  of  the  sharp  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  multi-factor  and 
labor productivity.15 
The income  loss  from the  1973-74  oil price shock  followed  by slow- 
growing  productivity  meant  that the benchmark did not regain its 1973 
level until 1979. Then the Iranian revolution  triggered the second  major 
OPEC oil  price  increases  and  the  cycle  of  unanticipated  inflation  and 
recession  began  again.16 Between  1973 and  1986,  the  CPS benchmark 
grew by 5.9% per decade  compared  to 20-30% per decade  in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Total compensation  increased  faster than wages  and salaries 
as employers  paid higher social security taxes and health insurance  pre- 
miums.  But when  the benchmark  is adjusted  for these benefits,  it grew 
by 8.2% per  decade  between  1973 and  1986, less  than one-third  of its 
earlier growth  rate. 
The role of rising labor productivity  in earnings gains is easy to accept. 
The  precise  sources  of  earnings  stagnation  are more  controversial.  In 
Section  1, I argued  that the post-1973 productivity  slowdown  worsened 
the  trade-off  between  employment  growth  and  the  growth  of  labor's 
marginal product.  The reader may ask whether  slow-growing  U.S. earn- 
ings reflected  nothing  more than rapid employment  growth  per se: that 
in Figure  1, the  U.S.  simply  moved  to  the  upper  left on  the  pre-1973 
frontier.  17 
Two kinds  of evidence  argue against  this view.  The first are the esti- 
mates of Kendrick (1984) and Denison  (1985) that rapid post-1973 growth 
in the  U.S.  labor force  (including  declining  labor force experience)  ac- 
counts  for only  about  .2% of a 1.5% slowdown  in the annual growth  of 
labor productivity. The second is the international nature of the productiv- 
ity slowdown  in which  the growth of multi-factor and labor productivity 
growth  slowed  sharply after 1973 even  in countries  without  rapid labor 
force growth  (Denison  1985; Maddison  1987). In sum,  the slowdown  of 
productivity  growth  exerted  independent  downward  pressure  on  U.S. 
real wages  above  and beyond  the pressure  of growing  employment. 
A second  argument  is that employee  compensation  has grown  slowly 
because  income  is increasingly  going  to owners  of property via interest 
payments,  dividends,  etc. Figure 6, originally prepared by the Joint Eco- 
nomic Committee  (JEC)  shows  that before 1980, the growth of compensa- 
15. Maddison  (1987) presents  the following  estimates  for the annual growth of joint factor 
productivity:  U.S.,  2.14% (1950-73),  .52% (1973-84);  Japan, 5.79% (1950-73),  1.21% 
(1973-84); Germany, 4.32% (1950-73),  1.55% (1973-84); United Kingdom,  2.14% (1950- 
73), 1.22% (1973-84).  The growth  of labor productivity  per se fell in a parallel fashion. 
16. More precisely,  the  1979-80  oil price shock added  unanticipated  inflation to what was 
already a high  rate of anticipated  inflation. 
17. This is equivalent  to saying  (as some  people  do) that the current slow  growth  in the 
U.S. labor force will auomatically  bring an end to the productivity  slowdown. Recent  Trends  in U.S. Earnings  and  Family  Incomes  *  83 
Figure  6 PRODUCTIVITY  (BOX)  AND REAL  COMP(CROSS) 
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tion  per hour  closely  tracked the  growth  of GNP per worker, but  that 
since  1980,  the  compensation  series  has  lagged  behind  the  output  se- 
ries.18 The biggest  part of  this  divergence  reflects  the  post-1980  differ- 
ence  between  the  GNP  deflator  (used  to adjust  GNP) and  the  CPI-X1 
(used to adjust compensation).19 At the same time, compensation's  nomi- 
nal share of GNP did fall from .385 in 1980 to .370 in 1986 while the share 
of property  income  (in particular, interest  payments)  rose  correspond- 
ingly. The point  is that over moderately  long  periods,  rising output  per 
worker is a necessary,  but not sufficient,  condition  for rising real wages. 
This is most  evident  in the case of manufacturing  where  the pressure  of 
recession  and import  competition  have  caused  labor negotiations  to fo- 
cus on job security more than real wage  gains,  despite  rising productiv- 
ity. But even  if 1986 compensation  was  raised by 4% (to adjust for the 
18. I wish  to thank Jim Klumpner  of the JEC staff for Figure 6 and  the discussion  of the 
points  of this paragraph. 
19. Prior to 1982 the CPI-X1 was similar to the standard CPI (Consumer Price Index) except 
that  it  measured  housing  costs  using  rental  equivalents  rather  than  house  prices. 
Beginning  in 1982, the CPI-X1 became  the "official" CPI. A different choice for adjust- 
ing compensation  would  not  have  produced  such  dramatic results.  For example,  be- 
tween  1980 and  1986,  the  implicit  GNP  deflator  rose  by  37.3% while  the  Personal 
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decline  in GNP  share) it would  remove  only  a small portion  the  slow- 
down  in earnings  growth  shown  in Table 1. Ultimately, that slowdown 
must be explained  by the slow  growth  of output  per worker. 
The pre-1973 growth  of real earnings  (and the corresponding  growth 
of family incomes)  played  important roles in national life-for  example, 
the sense  that each generation  would  live better than its parents.  Con- 
sider a young  man who,  at age 18, left his parents' home.  As he left, he 
observed  what  his father's paycheck  would  buy and he kept the obser- 
vation  as a personal  yardstick.  In the  1950s and  1960s, the young  man 
would  have  measured  up  quickly:  by  the  time  he  was  30,  his  real 
earnings  would  have  been  15-20%  greater  than  his  father's  earnings 
had been  12 years earlier.20  The young  man would  have known  early in 
his career that he  could  live  at least as well  as he had seen  his parents 
live.  (I discuss  a related  issue-the  expansion  of  the  middle  class-in 
Section 5.) 
The  growth  of  real wages  also  helped  to cushion  the  loss  of  "good 
jobs" that occurs  even  in  periods  of  strong  economic  growth  (Schum- 
peter,  1942, Chapter 8). The loss  of a good  job often  results in taking a 
different  job  at lower  pay  (e.g.,  Horvath  1987). When  real wages  are 
growing  throughout  the  economy,  a worker can imagine  regaining  his 
old real wage  in a few years and relative earnings declines  do not lead to 
absolute earnings  declines,  at least in the long run. But when  real wages 
are  stagnant,  absolute  earnings  declines  (and  the  permanent  loss  of 
"good jobs") are far more likely. I look at the issue  of good  and bad jobs 
in greater detail in the next section. 
3. A Loss  of Good  Jobs? 
In 1984, the Joint Economic  Committee  of the U.S.  Congress  published 
"The Great American  Job Machine,"  a paper  authored  by  Barry Blu- 
estone  and Bennett  Harrison (1986). The authors argued that while  the 
economic  expansion  of  1982-84  had  created  a  large  number  of  new 
jobs,  most  were  in what  they  defined  as the  "low wage"  category. By 
their calculations,  58% of  the  net  new  jobs  created between  1979 and 
1984 paid  less  than  $7,012  per  year  (or $7,712  in  1987 dollars).  "The 
Great American  Job Machine"  was  an  influential  paper  both  for  the 
media  attention  it received  and  the  way  it shaped  the  debate  over  the 
economy's  performance.  Even many of Bluestone  and Harrison's critics 
20. Richard Easterlin (1980) develops  similar examples  for point-in-time  comparisons.  As 
Table 1 suggests,  the  father's income  would  have  grown  over these  12 years as well. Recent  Trends  in U.S. Earnings  and  Family  Incomes  *  85 
to  address  the  "good  jobs"  argument  in  Bluestone  and  Harrison's 
terms.21 
In particular, both  Bluestone-Harrison  and many  of their critics used 
shifts  in the  distribution of real annual earnings to draw inferences  about 
changes  in  the  relative  number  of jobs with high hourly wages ("good 
jobs").2  This is,  as I noted  in Section  1, a big leap because  shifts in the 
distribution of real annual earnings  can arise from a number of different 
factors. 
One factor is a changing  composition  of the work force. At a point in 
time,  wage  rates  tend  to  rise with  experience  (holding  education  con- 
stant) and with education  (holding  experience constant).  It follows  that a 
shift  in  the  age/education  composition  of  the  work  force can shift  the 
distribution of annual earnings even if workers of a given age and educa- 
tion earn precisely  what their counterparts  earned in previous  years. 
A second  factor is hours worked.  In popular debate,  "good jobs" refer 
to jobs that pay  high  hourly  wages  but the good  jobs debate  has been 
based  on  the  distribution  of annual earnings  data.  One  example  of the 
problems this can cause is the upward trend in working women's  annual 
hours  of  work:  a  trend  that  could  shift  the  distribution  of  women's 
annual earnings  upward  even  though  wage  rates had not changed. 
Finally,  macroeconomic  events-unanticipated  inflation,  changes  in 
the level  of productivity,  etc.-can  shift  the distribution  of real annual 
earnings  distribution  even  when  the number of steel workers,  fast food 
clerks, professors,  etc. remains constant. 
The annual  earnings  distributions  of men  and women  shown  in Sec- 
tion  1 (Figures 2 and  3) were  potentially  influenced  by all of these  fac- 
tors.23 To begin  to  disentangle  these  effects,  Table 2 focuses  on  1973, 
1979, and 1986 mean annual earnings and estimated hourly wages  of 25- 
55-year-old  year-round  full-time  workers  subdivided  by  sex,  age,  and 
selected  educational  levels  (1987 dollars, PCE adjusted).  Earnings distri- 
21. A sample of critical  commentary  includes Kosters  and Ross (1988),  Samuelson  (1987), 
Brookes  (1987),  and the Council  of Economic  Advisers (1988)  while Norwood (1987)  is 
slightly more agnostic. Another  article  relevant  to the debate  is Rosenthal  (1985). 
22. Here and elsewhere in this paper, I use the term "wages"  to refer  to the hourly  rate  of 
compensation  of any employee, including  those whose pay is contracted  on a weekly, 
monthly,  or annual basis. 
23. The distributions  in Figures 2 and 3 differ in several respects from the distributions 
used by the authors  in the "good  jobs"  debate. Where  Figures  2 and 3 focus on 25-55- 
year-old  workers, those articles  often focused on all workers  age 16 and above. Where 
Figures  2 and 3 present the data in $10,000  increments,  most articles  in the debate  use 
two real dollar  cut-offs to divide annual earnings  into a "low-medium-high"  classifica- 
tion. In practice,  different  authors have chosen different  cut-offs  and this has further 
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Table 2  CHANGES IN MEAN INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS FOR MEN 
AND  WOMEN WHO WORK FULL-TIME,  BY AGE AND 
SELECTED  EDUCATIONAL LEVEL:  1973, 1979, AND  1986 
(1987 DOLLARS) 
Mean Earnings In:  Percent  Change  in: 
(Percent  Earning $20,000  Annual  E  s 
or jes})  Annual  Earnings  Wages 
o-  r Less) 
1973-  1973-  1973- 
1973  1979  1986  1979  1986  1986 
Men, 25-34 
4yrs.  H.S.  $26,364  $24,701  $22,226  -6%  -16%  -17% 
(27.0%)  (36.0%)  (47.5%) 
4 yrs. col.  $32,036  $29,062  $31,745  -9%  -1%  -3% 
(14.7%)  (23.6%)  (22.6%) 
Men, 35-44 
4 yrs. H.S.  $29,736  $28,992  $27,738  -3%  -7%  -7% 
(19.0%)  (24.5%)  (28.4%) 
4 yrs. col.  $43,331  $40,555  $40,194  -6%  -7%  -9% 
(9.3%)  (11.8%)  (13.2%) 
Men, 45-54 
4 yrs. H.S.  $30,621  $29,773  $29,520  -3%  -4%  -8% 
(19.8%)  (23.5%)  (24.2%) 
4 yrs. col.  $45,757  $43,565  $45,973  -5%  +1% 
(8.4%)  (10.9%)  (11.5%) 
Women,  25-34 
4 yrs. H.S.  $15,157  $15,516  $15,700  +2%  +4%  -8% 
(83.1%)  (81.0%)  (77.0%) 
4 yrs. col.  $20,733  $20,116  $23,333  -3%  +13%  +5% 
(47.9%)  (57.8%)  (43.7%) 
Women,  35-44 
4yrs.  H.S.  $16,006  $15,963  $17,373  +9%  +1% 
(77.4%)  (78.7%)  (69.3%) 
4 yrs. col.  $23,283  $21,391  $26,214  -8%  +13%  +5% 
(41.1%)  (51.4%)  (34.5%) 
Women,  45-54 
4 yrs. H.S.  $16,406  $16,456  $17,400  +6%  +3% 
(77.3%)  (76.6%)  (67.2%) 
4yrs.  col.  $23,075  $21,549  $25,001  -7%  +8%  +2% 
(39.3%)  (51.4%)  (30.8%) 
Source:  Author's  tabulations  of CPS micro data files. Recent  Trends  in U.S. Earnings  and  Family  Incomes  *  87 
butions  are typically  skewed  upward  and so each mean is accompanied 
by the proportion  of the sample who  earn less than $20,000.24  From 1973 
through  1979,  the  data  exhibit  the  slow  earnings  growth  described  in 
Section 2. Relationships  among  the relative earnings  of different groups 
also  remained  stable.  From  1979 through  1986,  the  average  earnings 
level in the work force continues  to show  little growth but relative earn- 
ings begin to diverge  sharply around the average. 
The  post-1979  dispersion  in  relative  earnings  contains  three  general 
elements.  First,  women's  earnings,  while  lower  than  men's  earnings, 
grew  faster than  men's  earnings.  For example,  among  year-round  full- 
time workers,  ages  25-34,  with  four years  of college,  women's  annual 
earnings increased by 13% while  men's annual earnings declined by 1%. 
A similar pattern holds  among  women  and men  of most other age and 
educational  levels:  women's  earnings  increased  while  men's  declined. 
The second  pattern involved  workers' education.  Among  workers of a 
given  sex  and  age,  the  earnings  of  the  less  educated  workers  usually 
showed  the slowest  gains  (or the biggest  declines).  For example,  among 
35-44-year-old  women  who  worked  year-round  and full-time,  the earn- 
ings  of women  with  four years of college  grew  by 13% over the period 
while  the  earnings  of women  with  four years  of high  school  grew  by 
4%.25 
Finally, among  all year-round  workers of the same sex, the earnings of 
young,  less  educated  workers  grew  less  (or declined  more)  than  the 
earnings  of all other groups. 
A more detailed  look at the data shows  that (estimated) hourly wages 
per se usually  grew  more  slowly  over  the  period  than  full-time  annual 
earnings.  As noted  above,  the CPS defines  a full-time worker as some- 
one  who  works  35  hours  or  more  per  week,  a  definition  which  still 
permits  variation  in annual  hours  worked  over time.  Women classified 
as year-round  full-time  workers  averaged  36.8 hours  of work per week 
in 1973 but 41.8 hours of work per week in 1986. Similarly, male full-time 
workers averaged  43.1 hours of work per week in 1973 and 45.3 hours of 
work per week  in 1986. The last column of Table 2 adjusts mean changes 
in  year-round  full-time  annual  earnings  for  mean  changes  in  hours 
worked  to approximate  changes  in hourly  wages.26 The resulting  esti- 
24. A more appropriate statistic for Table 2 would  be median earnings but the computation 
of medians  was  too cumbersome  for this paper. 
25. For clarity, the Table 2 is restricted to persons  with  exactly 12 or 16 years of education. 
Tabulations  not  published  here  indicate  a generally  monotonic  relationship  between 
earnings  changes  and education  within  each age-sex  group. 
26. The CPS does  not  report an individual's  annual  hours  of work.  Rather it reports the 
individual's  hours  of work in a "normal week"  and the number of weeks  worked  per 
year (where full-time workers must report working at least 50 weeks  per year). In 1986, 88 *  LEVY 
mates of wage  changes  reproduce  the three patterns noted  above but at 
lower absolute  rates of growth. 
The  gradual  convergence  of  men's  and  women's  earnings  has  been 
examined  by a number  of authors including  Smith and Ward (1984) and 
Fuchs  (1988). The standard  demonstration  of the convergence  is based 
on the ratio of published  median  incomes  of all women  to all men who 
work  year-around  and  full-time,  a ratio which  has  grown  from  .57 in 
1973 to  .60 in  1979 to  .65 in  1986 (U.S.  Bureau of  the  Census  1987b). 
Because  women  who  work  year-round  and  full-time  have  increased 
their average  hours  worked,  the standard  demonstration  is overstated. 
But the data in Table 2 demonstrate  convergence  even  when  hours are 
controlled. 
The growing  earnings  gap between  more and less  educated  workers 
has been  less  studied  and  is a reversal  of past  developments.  In 1976, 
Richard Freeman  published  The Overeducated  American, a book  which 
highlighted  the  falling  rate  of  return  to  a  college  diploma.  In  Free- 
man's  description,  America  had  reached  a  state  of  over-education  in 
which: 
...  the economic rewards to college education are markedly  lower than has 
historically  been the case and/or in which additional  investment in college train- 
ing will drive down those rewards-a  society in which  education  has become,  like 
investments in other mature industries or activities a  marginal rather than 
highly profitable  endeavor.  (pp. 4-5). 
Published  U.S.  Census  data supported  Freeman's view.  Consider  the 
behavior over time of the following  ratio: 
Median Income  of 25-34-year-old men with 4 years of college 
Median Income  of 25-34-year-old men with 4 years of H. S.27 
Throughout  the  1950s, the ratio stood  at about 1.3. By the end of the 
1960s the increasing  number of college graduates had caused the ratio to 
fall to 1.25. And by 1973-roughly  the time Freeman was writing-it  had 
fallen to 1.15. 
both  numbers  were  reported  as  continuous  variables.  In  1973,  the  weeks  worked 
variable was reported in classes  with the top class being 50-52  weeks  per year. For this 
reason,  changes  in annual  hours  worked  were  estimated  from changes  in hours  nor- 
mally  worked  per  week,  calculated  separately  for each  age-education-sex  group  of 
year-round  full-time workers. 
27. We use  income  statistics  in  this  comparison  rather than earnings  per se because  the 
Census  did not publish  separate earnings  statistics in the 1950s and 1960s. Recent  Trends  in U.S. Earnings  and  Family  Incomes  *  89 
The ratio remained  between  1.15 and 1.2 for the rest of the 1970s. But 
then,  as we  have  seen,  the  ground  began  to shift,  most  clearly under 
younger  men  (Table 2).  Among  25-34-year-old  men,  the  ratio grew  to 
1.30 in 1980 (a recession  year) and kept increasing  to 1.5 in 1986.28 
Together, the data in Tables 1 and 2 begin  to suggest  a two-part story 
of post-1973  earnings  changes.  The first part is the combination  of oil- 
price shocks  and slow  productivity  growth  which,  together,  slowed  the 
rate of real wage  growth  for all workers.  The second part is a set of shifts 
in the demand  and supply  of different kinds of labor which caused some 
workers'  earnings  to grow  faster than  the  underlying  trend  and  other 
workers' wages  to grow more slowly.  What remains to be determined  is 
the relative importance  of supply  shifts and demand  shifts in this story. 
I begin to look at this question  in Table 3 which extends Table 2 to look 
at the 1973 and  1986 mean  earnings  of all men and women,  ages 25-55, 
who  worked  at least  one  hour  for pay  during  the  year  (the  basis  for 
Figures 2 and 3). For purposes  of comparison,  Table 3 reproduces  from 
Table 2 the percentage  change in earnings for the subset of workers who 
worked year-round  and full-time. Earnings patterns for all workers repli- 
cate  earnings  patterns  for  year-round  full-time  workers  with  slightly 
larger amplitudes;  this  suggests  that groups  who  saw  wage  gains  also 
saw  gains  in  average  hours  worked,  while  groups  that  saw  wage  de- 
clines  saw  declining  average  hours  as  well.  The  fact that  wages  and 
hours  were  moving  in  the  same  direction  suggests  that relative  wage 
movements  were primarily driven by shifts in demand.29 
Table 4 addresses  the  issue  of supply  and  demand  more  directly by 
comparing  changes  in a group's  mean annual earnings with  changes  in 
the  group's  size.  These  data  also  point  to  the  importance  of  demand 
shifts in relative earnings  movements.  Among  men or women  of a given 
age,  the  number  of college  educated  workers  grew  more  quickly  than 
the number  of high  school  educated  workers  but high  school  workers' 
earnings grew more slowly. Similarly, among workers of a given age and 
education,  the number  of working  women  grew more rapidly than the 
number  of working  men  but women's  mean  earnings  increased  while 
men's  mean  earnings  declined  or, in a few cases,  remained constant. 
28. This  fact  seems  to  have  been  discovered  more  or less  independently  by  Levy  and 
Michel (1987), Sum and Fogg (1987), Murphy and Welch (1988), and Freeman (personal 
communication). 
29. Ideally, one would  verify this fact by directly tabulating annual hours worked.  As noted 
earlier,  however,  the  1973 Current  Population  Survey  only  contains  data  on  hours 
normally  worked  per  week  (a continuous  variable)  and  weeks  worked  per  year  (a 
classified  variable).  Among  people  who  work  part-year,  weeks  worked  is  coded  in 
broad  classes-e.g.,  27-39  weeks-which  mean  that  annual  hours  of  work  can  be 
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Table  3  MEAN  EARNINGS  OF ALL  MEN  AND WOMEN  WITH  $1 OR 
MORE  OF EARNINGS,  1973  AND 1986, (1987  DOLLARS) 
Mean  Annual 
Earnings  In:  Percent  Change 
(Percent  Earning  Change  in  in Earnings  for 
$20,000  or Less)  Earnings  Subset  of 
for  All  Year-Round 
1973  1986  Workers  Full-Time  Workers) 
Men, 25-34 
4 yrs. H.S.  $24,267  $19,410  -20%  -16% 
(35.7%)  (60.2%) 
4 yrs. col.  $28,339  $29,170  +3%  -1% 
(27.7%)  (32.5%) 
Men, 35-44 
4 yrs. H.S.  $27,946  $25,103  -11%  -7% 
(25.5%)  (41.8%) 
4 yrs. col.  $41,926  $38,374  -8%  -7% 
(12.8%)  (20.1%) 
Men, 45-54 
4yrs. H.S.  $28,102  $27,133  -3%  -4% 
(28.5%)  (37.9%) 
4 yrs. col.  $42,988  $43,803  +2% 
(14.7%)  (18.4%) 
Women, 25-34 
4yrs. H.S.  $9,870  $11,133  +13%  +4 
(94.9%)  (89.9%) 
4 yrs. col.  $14,876  $18,850  +27%  +13% 
(78.1%)  (64.1%) 
Women, 35-44 
4yrs. H.S.  $10,926  $12,440  +14%  +9% 
(92.2%)  (85.8%) 
4 yrs. col.  $14,878  $19,837  +33%  +27% 
(80.1%)  (62.3%) 
Women, 45-54 
4yrs. H.S.  $12,233  $13,220  +8%  +6% 
(91.1%)  (85.1%) 
4 yrs. col.  $18,835  $19,753  +5%  +3% 
(72.0%)  (59.5%) 
Source:  Author's  Tabulations  of CPS micro data files. Recent  Trends  in U.S. Earnings  and  Family  Incomes  *  91 
In  sum,  demand  shifts  do  not  explain  absolute earnings  gains  and 
losses-oil  price shocks and the productivity  slowdown  are the principal 
cuprits here.  But demand  shifts  help  to explain  relative earnings  gains 
and  losses-why  some  groups  did  better  than  the  generally  stagnant 
trend while  others  did worse. 
A  story  of  demand  shifts  begins  by  examining  the  distribution  of 
workers  across  industries  in  the  early  1970s where,  for clarity, I have 
collapsed  industries  into four groups: 
* Durable and Non-Durable  Manufacturing 
* Mining and Construction 
* Agriculture 
Table  4  CHANGES  IN GROUP'S  SIZE  AND GROUP'S  AVERAGE  ANNUAL 
EARNINGS,  FOR  25-55 YEAR-OLD  MEN  AND WOMEN 
WORKERS, 1973-1986 
Number  of 
Numbers  in:  Percent  Percent 
Workes  i:  Change  Change 
1973  1986  in Group  in Annual 
(millions)  Size  Earnings 
Men, 25-34 
4 yrs. H.S.  5.1m  8.1m  +58%  -20% 
4yrs. col.  1.8m  3.3m  +83%  +3% 
Men, 35-44 
4 yrs. H.S.  3.8m  5.3m  +39%  -11% 
4yrs. col.  l.lm  2.6m  +136%  -8% 
Men, 45-54 
4 yrs. H.S.  4.0m  3.8m  -5%  -3% 
4yrs. col.  l.lm  1.2m  +9%  +2% 
Women, 25-34 
4yrs. H.S.  3.5m  6.7m  +91%  +13% 
4yrs. col.  l.lm  3.0m  +172%  +27% 
Women, 35-44 
4yrs. H.S.  2.8m  5.8m  +107%  +14% 
4yrs. col.  .5m  1.7m  +240%  +33% 
Women, 45-54 
4 yrs. H.S.  3.0m  4.0m  +33%  +8% 
4yrs. col.  .4m  .8m  +100%  +5% 
Source:  Author's  tabulations  of March 1974 and March 1987 CPS micro data files. 92 *  LEVY 
* The  Service Sector including wholesale  and  retail trade, finance- 
insurance-and real estate,  personal services, business  and  profes- 
sional services, transportation-utilities-communication,  and public ad- 
ministration 
* Persons who were not employed during the year (for men only).30 
Table  5 shows the 1973 distribution  of men and women across these 
employment categories. In 1973, less educated men were concentrated 
in durable manufacturing  and other goods producing industries while 
more educated men and women were concentrated  in services. Among 
men with a high school education or less, about 45%  were employed in 
durable  manufacturing  or other goods industries while about 40%  were 
employed in the service sector. Among men with at least some college, 
about 60% were employed in the service sector. Among women, the 
proportion  employed in the service sector  ran from  54%  (for  women who 
had not graduated  high school) to 97%  (for  women with more than four 
years of college). 
At this point, it is useful to ask where the "good jobs" were in 1973: 
Which industries paid men31  relatively high annual earnings (holding 
observed characteristics  constant). In recent years, it has become a cliche 
that good jobs are in manufacturing  while the bad jobs are in services. 
While the cliche is stated in general terms, it clearly  refers to good and 
bad jobs for less  educated workers (or all today's pre-law and pre- 
finance undergraduates are making a terrible mistake). But even if I 
restrict attention to less educated men, earnings patterns in the early 
1970s  were slightly more complex than the cliche suggests. 
Table  6 contains estimates of two-digit industry effects on the annual 
earnings of men with four years of high school and, for comparison, 
men with four years of college.32  The 1973  estimates for high school men 
show that annual earnings in Retail Sales were about 13% less than 
annual earnings in Durable Manufacturing,  the kind of gap noted 20 
years ago by Victor Fuchs (1968). But annual earnings were slightly 
higher in Transportation,  Communications,  and Utilities (with the high 
capital  intensity described by Katz and Summers (1988))  and in Whole- 
30. Later in this section,  we  will compare  industrial  distributions  for women  in 1973 and 
1986. Women's  labor force participation  increased  sharply during  this period and this 
makes it hard to separate industrial shifts from increased labor supply. For this reason, 
we confine  women's  industrial  distributions  to working  women. 
31. We restrict this discussion  to men because  women  were already highly concentrated in 
the service sector (the sector of "bad jobs" in the popular debate). 
32. Estimates  come  from separate  regressions  for each educational  group,  controlling  for 
age  and  industry.  Age-industry  interactions  for 23-34-year-old  workers  (i.e.,  entry 
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Table 5  DISTRIBUTION OF MEN AND  WOMEN ACROSS INDUSTRIAL 
SECTORS, 1973 
Mining  Persons 
and  Service  Who Did 
Mfg.  Constrctn.  Sector  Agr.  Not Work* 
All Men, 25-55, 
by education 
L.T. H.S.  .32  .16  .35  .07  .10 
H.S.  Grad.  .32  .12  .48  .04  .04 
1-3  yrs. col.  .26  .08  .59  .02  .05 
4 yrs. col.  .24  .06  .65  .02  .03 
4+  yrs. col.  .14  .02  .80  .01  .03 
Women,  25-55, 
by education 
L.T. H.S.  .35  .01  .54  .09  n/a 
H.S.  Grad.  .20  .02  .76  .02  n/a 
1-3  yrs. col.  .12  .01  .86  .01  n/a 
4 yrs. col.  .06  .02  .91  .01  n/a 
4+  yrs. col.  .02  .01  .97  .00  n/a 
*Data for women  exclude  persons  who  did not work during the year. See text for explanation. 
Source:  Author's  tabulations  of the March 1974 CPS micro data files. 
Table 6  EFFECTS  OF INDUSTRY ON THE ANNUAL  EARNINGS OF 
SELECTED  25-34-YEAR-OLD  MEN (REFERENCE  GROUP IS MEN 
IN NON-DURABLE  MANUFACTURING) 
Men with 4 Yrs.  Men with 4 Yrs. 
High School  College 
Ref. Group  1973  1986  1973  1986 
Earnings  $22,711  $19,853  $29,149  $29,240 
Ag/For/Fsh.  -46.2%*  -83.3%*  -33.9%  -87.2%* 
Mining  -.6%  +16.5%  -4.9%  +25.4% 
Construction  -3.6%  -23.3%  -25.2%  -21.6% 
Non-Durable  Mfg.  -  - 
Durable Mfg.  +4.0%  +.7%  -6.4%  +8.9% 
Trans/Com/Utl.  +7.4%*  -1.0%  +.2%  +1.2% 
Wholesale  Trd.  +5.6%  -4.5%  -12.4%**  +4.4% 
Retail Trade  -12.7%*  -31.5%*  -23.2%*  -32.1%* 
FIRE  +6.9%  -11.8%  -9.9%**  -2.4% 
Bsns/Rpr/Srv.  -11.9%*  -44.9%*  -27.3%*  -15.8%* 
Pers. Srv.  -34.8%*  -45.5%*  -38.4*  -44.4%* 
Prof. Srv.  -18.4%*  -37.5%*  -23.8%*  -25.8%* 
Public Adm.  +2.2%  +3.2%  -6.5%  -5.7%* 
* =  coefficient  from  which  percentage  change  was  estimated  was  significant  at the  .05 level;  **  = 
significant at the .10 level. 
Source:  Estimates  calculated  from regressions  of LN (annual  earnings)  on age and industry  for 25-55- 
year-old men with  four yrs. high  school  and four yrs. college  (separate regressions). 94  LEVY 
sale Trade. If anything,  the  1973 earnings  pattern for young  men  with 
four years of college  fit the cliche slightly better. 
The earnings  patterns for less educated  men point to the possibility  of 
a disequilibrium  in which  at least some men were working in the service 
sector (outside  Transportation,  Communications,  and Utilities) because 
vacancies  in higher wage  industries  were not available.33 
In the  13 years  after 1973, vacancies  in manufacturing,  in particular 
did  not  grow  appreciably.  Manufacturing-particularly  durable manu- 
facturing-is  sensitive  to  economic  downturns.  The  years  after  1973 
saw  two  sharp  downturns:  1973-75  and  1980-82  (Lawrence  1982). Be- 
yond  this,  the  post  1982 recovery  was  accompanied  by an overvalued 
high  dollar which  further undercut  both foreign and domestic  demand 
for U.S.  manufactured  goods.  Between  1973 and 1979, employment  on 
manufacturing  payrolls  increased  by  5%, much  less  than  the  growth 
in the male labor force. Between  1979 and 1986, employment  on manu- 
facturing  payrolls  declined  by  10%.  (Council  of  Economic  Advisers, 
1989). 
Table 7 compares  the  1973, 1979, and  1986 industrial  distributions  of 
men and women.  Among  25-34-year-olds  with a high school education, 
the proportion in manufacturing  fell sharply from .34 to .24 with most of 
the drop coming after 1979. Conversely, among 25-34-year-old  men with 
four years of college,  the proportion of college educated men in manufac- 
turing  held  steady  at  .20.  The  comparison  is  noteworthy  because  the 
absolute  number  of college  educated  men in this age group grew faster 
than the number  of high  school  educated  men  (Table 4). This suggests 
that less  educated  young  men  were  losing  manufacturing  jobs not only 
because  of the slow  growth  of manufacturing  employment  but because 
the composition  of that employment  was shifting toward more educated 
workers. 
In theory, the shift of younger,  less educated men out of goods produc- 
tion  might  have  been  a voluntary  response  to more  attractive alterna- 
tives in other sectors.  The 1986 pattern of high school men's earnings by 
industry  in  Table 6  suggests  this  was  not  the  case:  the  earnings  gap 
between  manufacturing  and  service  sector industries  was  sharper and 
more  uniform  in  1986 than  it  had  been  in  1973.  More  plausibly,  the 
contraction of manufacturing  employment  placed young,  less  educated 
men  in  a position  of  excess  supply.  To a limited  extent,  service  sector 
33. One might postulate  a similar disequilibrium  among  college  educated  men except that 
industry-specific  training makes  substitution  across industries  more problematic (e.g., 
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industries  acted as an absorbing buffer, but at the cost of a steep  decline 
in service  sector  earnings,  which  led  to the  sharpened  manufacturing/ 
services  distinction  noted  above.3  More  generally,  the  movement  of 
younger,  less  educated  men  out  of  manufacturing  did  not  represent 
more service sector employment  so much as more young  men out of the 
labor force. The earnings  statistics in Tables 2 and 3 exclude men who  do 
not work  during  the  year but the  existence  of such  men  also points  to 
their being  in excess  supply.  The result was  a sharp decline  in the rela- 
tive earnings  of young,  less educated  men in all sectors (Table 6) includ- 
ing manufacturing.35 
When compared  to young,  less educated  men,  other groups  of work- 
ers were  in relatively  stronger  positions.  Older, less  educated  men  had 
the benefit  of job seniority  while  better educated  men and most women 
were  heavily  concentrated  in  the  service  sector  and  so  were  relatively 
insulated  from  the  problems  of  manufacturing.36 Better educated  wo- 
men,  in particular, appear to have benefited  from a moderate amount of 
occupational  mobility  (Bianchi and Spain 1986). 
It follows  that a resolution  of the good jobs-bad jobs debate must make 
three  points.  The  first point  is the  slow  growth  of earnings-a  macro- 
economic  phenomenon-which  affected earnings in all sectors. Today, a 
young  man (or woman)  with  four years of college can accept what used 
to be called a good  white  collar job for $25,000 and wonder  whether  he 
will ever be able to afford a house  like the one in which  he grew up.  In 
this sense,  weak  productivity  growth  (and the income losses  of oil price 
shocks)  have  limited  the number  of jobs with  "middle class paychecks" 
and  have  helped  create  a  wide  audience  for  the  good  jobs-bad  jobs 
debate. 
The second  poin  is the shift in demand  away  from young,  less  edu- 
cated  male  workers.  In 1973, 64% of male high  school  graduates,  ages 
25-34,  earned more than $20,000 per year (in 1987 dollars). By 1986, the 
corresponding  proportion  had declined  to 40%. Shifts in demand  occur 
all  the  time,  of  course,  but  reduced  demand  in  a  context  of  general 
stagnation  has much  more serious  implications.  Elsewhere,  I have esti- 
mated that today's 30-year-old male high school graduate will have trou- 
ble  out-earning  his  high  school  educated  father  if  labor  productivity 
34. Earnings in Transportation,  Communications,  and Utilities also dropped  as a result of 
deregulation. 
35. A recent paper by Blackburn, Bloom,  and Freeman (1989) similarly concludes  that the 
decline  in the earnings  of young,  less educated  men,  is much more a function of wage 
declines  within  industries  than shifts of employment  across industry. 
36. Though  it appears from Tables 5 and 6 that young,  less educated women  faced some of 
the same pressure  from manufacturing  as young,  less educated  men. 96 - LEVY 
Table 7  DISTRIBUTION OF MEN AND  WOMEN ACROSS INDUSTRIAL 
SECTORS, BY SELECTED  AGE AND  EDUCATION,  1973, 1979, 
AND  1986 
Other 
Goods  Service 
Mfg.  Industries  Sector  Agr. 
Men, 25-34 
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.70  .02 
.49  .04 
.46  .04 
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.64  .02 
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.50  .05 
.48  .04 
.48  .04 
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.62  .01 
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Table  7  DISTRIBUTION  OF MEN AND WOMEN  ACROSS  INDUSTRIAL 
SECTORS,  BY  SELECTED  AGE  AND EDUCATION,  1973, 1979, 
AND 1986  (CONTINUED) 
Other  Persons 
Goods  Service  Who  Did 
Mfg.  Industries  Sector  Agr.  Not Work* 
4 yrs. col. 
1973  .03  -.96  .01  n/a 
1979  .07  .01  .92  .01  n/a 
1986  .07  .01  .91  .01  n/a 
Women 45-55 
H.S. Grad. 
1973  .19  .01  .77  .03  n/a 
1979  .18  .02  .79  .02  n/a 
1986  .17  .01  .79  .03  n/a 
4 yrs. col. 
1973  .04  .01  .94  .01  n/a 
1979  .05  .02  .92  .02  n/a 
1986  .06  -  .93  .01  n/a 
Note:  Rows may not sum to 1.00 due to rounding. 
Source:  Author's  Tabulations  of the March  1974,  March  1980,  and March  1987  CPS  micro  data  files. CPS 
public  use sample. 
continues  to grow  at recent rates (Levy 1988b), something  that is quite 
new  in the American  experience.37 
Finally, the  good  jobs-bad  jobs debate  is more a story about men  (in 
particular, young,  less  educated  men)  than women.  Women's  earnings 
are systematically  below  those  of  men  but  the  proportion  of  women 
earning more than $20,000 per year rose from 16% in 1973 to 27 percent 
in 1986. A large part of this increase reflects increased hours of work but 
at least  some  part reflects  rising  real wages.  Among  younger  women 
there  is  some  evidence  of  growing  inequality  between  more  and  less 
educated  workers.  But  on  the  whole,  women's  position  in  the  labor 
market  improved  moderately  over  this  period  both  in  absolute  terms 
and relative to men. 
4. Income  Per  Worker  and  Income  Per  Capita 
In the  long  view  of U.S.  economic  history,  the  period  from the  end  of 
World War II through  1973 was unusual  for its relative tranquility and its 
37. In similar calculations,  I estimate  that today's 30-year-old male college educated worker 
will  out-earn  his college  educated  father but only by about 5 percent,  much less  than 
the 1950s and 1960s. 98 *  LEVY 
sustained  income  growth.  During  this  time,  Americans  experienced 
steadily  rising living  standards  with  the benefits  described in Section 2: 
young  people's  certainty that they would  live better than their parents, a 
"cushion" for shifting  employment  patterns,  and so on.  In this context, 
the  post-1973  stagnation  of  worker's  incomes  might  have  come  as  an 
enormous  shock to the country. 
There was a shock,38 but it was smaller than one might have expected. 
One  data series  helps  explain  the reason.  Income  per capita,  the most 
widely  used  measure  of  living  standards,  was  growing  strongly  even 
though  individual  wage  rates  were  not.  The  Census  reports  that  be- 
tween  1973 and  1986, the median  income  of all men  who  worked  year- 
round  and  full-time  declined  from $27,490 to $26,926 (-2%)  while  the 
comparable figure for women  rose from $15,533 to $17,147 (+ 10%). Over 
the same period,  the Census  measure  of income  per capita (i.e.,  Census 
defined  income  per man,  woman  and child) rose briskly from $9,926 to 
$12,250,  (+22%).  As  noted  in Section  1, the  Census  measures  pre-tax, 
money  receipts  (excluding  capital  gains)  but  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce measure  of disposable  income  per capita, which corrects for taxes 
paid,  capital  gains,  and  noncash  income,  also  rose  by  21% over  the 
period. 
The divergent  trends in income  per worker and income per capita can 
be reconciled  by noting  the substantial  increase in the proportion of the 
population  who  worked.  In  1973,  the  civilian  labor force  represented 
42% of the entire  U.S.  population.  By 1986, the labor force represented 
50% of the entire population.39 This increase in relative labor supply  was 
the result of three factors: increases in women's  labor force participation, 
the  entrance  of  the  largest  baby-boom  cohorts  into  the  work  force  (as 
they  entered  their late teenage  years and early 20s), and sustained  low 
birth rates throughout  the period. 
In microcosm,  these  changes  meant  a sharp move  away  from "1950s 
families"  with  one  paycheck  and  two  or three  children.  1980s families 
typically  had  two  paychecks  and  one  or two  children.  In the  limit,  a 
sharp rise in the  median  age  at first marriage increased  the number  of 
persons  who  remained  outside  of families and who had only themselves 
38. One  can argue,  for example,  that one  cause  of the late-1970s taxpayer revolt was  the 
tension  between  stagnant  incomes  and  growing  government  expenditures.  Idiosyn- 
cratic conditions  in various  states also played  important roles (see Levy 1979). 
39. See, for example,  Council of Economic Advisers  (1989), Tables B-31 and B-32. Note that 
the figures  refer to the ratio of the labor force to the entire population  rather than the 
population  aged  16 and over which  is used  in the computation  of labor force participa- 
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to support.4  For the  economy  as a whole,  the  changes  meant  that in- 
come per capita (per man,  woman,  and child) could keep rising despite 
stagnant income per worker because a growing proportion of the popula- 
tion was at work.41 
To what  extent  were  smaller  families  and  increased  women's  labor 
force  participation  endogenous  responses  to  stagnant  earnings?  The 
answer  is far from clear. We know  that women's  labor force participa- 
tion  had  been  increasing  steadily  since  the  1950s  (Bianchi and  Spain 
1986), and  the baby boom  which  ended  in 1964 (Butz and Ward 1979), 
both well  before  the  onset  of stagnation.  At the same  time,  each trend 
is consistent  with  income  growth  that fails to satisfy consumption  aspi- 
rations  and  both  trends  might  have  leveled  off  sooner  in  an  environ- 
ment  of  strong  wage  growth  (Elster and  Kamlet  1987).  Self-reported 
explanations  of  behavior  are,  of  course,  treacherous  because  people 
often see themselves  as behaving  normally-e.g.,  having a normal num- 
ber of children-even  while  the norms themselves  are changing  rapidly 
over time. 
What is clear is that demographic  shifts are not a mechanism for contin- 
ued  increases  in  living  standards.  Today, about  two-thirds  of  young 
husband-wife  couples  begin married life with both partners working.  At 
the same time, the birth rate has stopped  falling while the median age of 
first marriage has stopped  increasing.  Together, these trends place limits 
on  further  increases  in  the  proportion  of  the  population  at work  and 
they underline  what  is simply  common  sense:  Whatever their short run 
divergence,  income  per capita can ultimately grow no faster than income 
per worker.42 
40. In 1970, the median age of first marriage  was 21 for women and 23 for men. By 1986, 
the median age of first  marriage  had risen by about  two years for each group. See U.S. 
Bureau  of the Census, 1987a. 
41. During  this period, the U.S. also increased  its living standards  through  foreign  borrow- 
ing, but Census income statistics  are not a good device for measuring  this increase.  As 
a  rough approximation, foreign borrowing permitted the  federal government to 
sharply  reduce taxes and run budget deficits  without forcing  drastic  reductions  in the 
rate of gross investment. Because  Census incomes statistics  are measured  on a pre-tax 
basis, they do not capture  the increase  in disposable  income that comes from  reduced 
taxes. For  a discussion of foreign  borrowing  and living standards,  see Litan,  Lawrence, 
and Schultze (1988),  Chapters  1 and 2. 
42. The stagnation  in real incomes has also been questioned  on the grounds that we do a 
poor job of measuring the output of the service sector-particularly convenience 
aspects-and  so understate the growth of output. Recent work by Martin  N. Baily 
and Robert  J. Gordon  (1988)  have examined  this question  in the context  of the produc- 
tivity slowdown. They find that the probable  mismeasurement  of output is relatively 
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5. The  Family  Income  Distribution 
In casual discussion,  inequality in the earnings distribution and inequal- 
ity in the  family  income  distribution  are often  treated interchangeably. 
The two distributions  are related, a relationship  I begin to explore in the 
next  section,  but  the  distributions  also  differ  in  many  respects.  Put 
briefly, family incomes  depend  on trends in individual  earnings but they 
also  depend  on  trends  in  the  number  of earners per family as well  as 
trends in incomes  from sources  other than earnings  (interest payments, 
private pensions,  government  transfer payments,  etc.). 
In the years  since  World War II, Census  measures  of the U.S.  family 
income  distribution  have displayed  two main characteristics: substantial 
absolute  inequality,  and  general  stability. By Census  measures,  1969, a 
year of  extremely  tight  labor markets,  was  the  year of greatest  family 
income  inequality.  In that year, however,  the poorest quintile of families 
received  5.6% of  all family  income  while  the  richest  quintile  received 
40.6%, a ratio of about  $1.00 to $7.25.  In 1986, the corresponding  ratio 
was $1.00 to $9.50,  but as shown  in Table 8, a family did not have to be 
millionaires  to be in the top fifth of families. 
The best  international  comparisons  of income  inequality  suggest  that 
U.S.  family income  inequality  is high  not only  absolutely  but also rela- 
tive to inequality  in other  countries.  For example  Sawyer  (1976) shows 
that the  poorest  quintile  of U.S.  households  received  3.8% of pre-tax in- 
come  in  1972,  compared  to  5.4%  in  Germany  (1973),  7.6% in  Japan 
(1969), 4.4% in the United Kingdom,  4.3% in Canada (1969), and so on.43 
More recent work by Coder, Rainwater, and Smeeding  (1988), using data 
developed  by the Luxembourg  Income Study, shows  that in the 1979-83 
period,  the  level  of  disposable  income  inequality  among  U.S.  families 
was  highest  among  the ten industrialized  countries  in their sample  (in- 
cluding  Germany, the United Kingdom,  and Canada).4 
The relative  stability of U.S.  family income  inequality  is displayed  in 
Table 8. Through 39 years, the income  share going to the poorest quintile 
of families has varied between  4.6% and 5.6% while  the income  share of 
the top quintile  has varied between  40.6% and 43.7%. 
The  variations  in  Table 8  are larger  than  they  seem.  For example, 
the  income  share  of  the  lowest  quintile  has  varied  in  a range  of  1%. 
But this  is a range  of  1% of all family income for a group  that received 
43. Households  include  both  families  and  other living  units  in which  the inhabitants  are 
not related.  I have  used  Sawyer's  pre-tax income  figures  to in order to be consistent 
with the Census  pre-tax income  figures used  throughout  this paper. Sawyer also calcu- 
lates post-tax distributions  and arrives at similar conclusions. 
44. This ranking was invariant to three inequality  measures: Atkinson's  measure  (with e = 
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only  about 5% of all family income  to begin with.  In 1986, for example, 
an  income  share  of  5.6%  rather  than  4.6% would  have  raised  mean 
income  in  the  lowest  quintile  from $8,363  to $10,181 (in 1987 dollars), 
no  small  difference.  But over  39 years  the  size  of these  swings  is rela- 
tively moderate. 
The  stability  of  the  family  income  distribution  over  almost  four de- 
cades raises three quite different questions.  First, is the stability real or is 
it an artifact of Census  data definitions  and procedures? Second,  how  is 
the  stability  consistent  with  popular  perceptions  that the  middle  class 
grew  dramatically  in  the  1950s and  1960s (Gans  1967), but is  now  "in 
danger  of  vanishing"  (Kuttner  1983; Thurow  1984).  Finally, why  did 
inequality  remain  constant  in  the  face  of  two  developments  favoring 
equality:  the  declining  proportion  of families  in low  wage  agriculture, 
and the improving  relative incomes  of elderly families.  I briefly address 
each question  in turn. 
As I noted  in Section  1, the Census  defines  income  as pre-tax money 
receipts  excluding  capital gains.  Moreover,  to preserve  confidentiality, 
other income  sources  are reported  with  top codes  ("caps") that change 
only infrequently. In 1986, for example,  both wages  and salaries and self- 
employment  income  were  not  reported  in  excess  of  $100,000  for any 
individual.  In the  early  and  mid-1980s,  capital gains  realizations  were 
high  and  top  salaries  in many  professions  were  growing  fast. There is 
little doubt  that during  this period,  income  coding  limits and  the non- 
reporting  of  capital  gains  combined  to  understate  both  the  level  and 
Table  8  SHAPE  OF THE  U.S. FAMILY  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION 
A. Share  of  All Family  Income  Going  to Each  Fifth  of  Families 
1st  5th 
fifth  2nd  3rd  4th  fifth 
(poorest)  fifth  fifth  fifth  (richest)  Total 
1949  4.5%  11.9%  17.3%  23.5%  42.7%  100% 
1959  4.9%  12.3%  17.9%  23.8%  41.1%  100% 
1969  5.6%  12.4%  17.7%  23.7%  40.6%  100% 
1979  5.2%  11.6%  17.5%  24.1%  41.7%  100% 
1986  4.6%  10.8%  16.8%  24.0%  43.7%  100% 
B. 1986  Income  Upper  Limits  for Each  Quintile  (1987  dollars) 
1st Q Ends  2nd Q Ends  3rd Q Ends  4th Q Ends 
at  at  at  at 
$14,500  $25,082  $36,564  $52,597 
Note:  Percentages  may not add up to 100  due to rounding. 
Source:  U.S. Bureau  of the Census (1986b) 102  LEVY 
growth  of income  inequality  in Census  reports.45 Joseph  Pechman,  for 
example,  has compiled  data from the U.S. Treasury's annual Statistics of 
Income series,  which  show  that the  share  of gross  income  received  by 
the  top  one-fifth  of  filing  units  (as  distinct  from  families)  rose  from 
43.1% in  1981 to  52.3% in  1986,  a far larger shift  than  is  implied  by 
Census  statistics  (personal  communication).  Pechman further estimates 
that  6.6  percentage  points  of  this  9.2  percentage  point  gain  in  share 
accrued  to the  top  1% of filing  units.  A  1987 study  by Richard Kasten 
and  Frank Sammartino  of  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  arrives at 
similar, but  less  dramatic conclusions  for households  (as distinct  from 
families)  (Congressional  Budget  Office  1987).46  Both studies  are consis- 
tent with  recent explorations  of CPS data by Gottschalk,  Danziger,  and 
Smolensky  (1988) who  conclude  that even  among  husband-wife  fami- 
lies under age 65, property income  is important only among  the top 1% 
of  the  population  while  the  biggest  income  gains  for the  rest  of  this 
group  have  come  from wives'  earnings.  In sum,  even  if one  acknowl- 
edges  the different  units  of observation  used  by the Census,  Pechman, 
and the CBO, it is almost  certain that Census  conventions  that exclude 
capital gains  and cap reported  incomes  have caused  understated  recent 
trends  in  income  inequality  particularly  in  the  upper  ranges  of  the 
distribution. 
At the same time, reasonable adjustments  for this understatement  still 
would  leave the inequality figures in Table 8 too uniform to be consistent 
with  a  rapidly  expanding  middle  class  in  the  1950s and  1960s and  a 
middle  class under  pressure  in the 1980s. The issue  is further muddled 
because  in 1986, the top quintile of the family income distribution began 
at  $52,597  (in  1987  dollars),  an  income  which  many  families  see  as 
squarely in the middle  class. The major answer to this paradox, I believe, 
is the  income  growth  and  stagnation  described  in  Section  2.  Between 
1947 and  1986, median  family  income  rose  from $14,830 to $28,890 (36 
percent per decade).  This growth was accompanied by rapid increases in 
the  proportions  of  families  who  owned  their  own  homes,  and  who 
owned  cars,  washing  machines,  dryers,  televisions,  air conditioners, 
and  so  on.  The  middle  class  was  growing  not  because  incomes  were 
becoming  substantially  more equal but because  more families could af- 
45. There is the  more  general  problem  of non-response  and underreporting  of incomes, 
problems  that are not limited  to upper  income  groups.  See Levy (1988a) Appendix  B, 
Lillard, Smith,  and Welch (1986). 
46. Distributional  studies  based  on  households  can be influenced  by  such  factors as the 
rising age of first marriage which  increases  the number of single person households  in 
the  sample.  The issue  has  become  confused  because  CBO uses  the  term "family" to 
include  both  families  (in the  Census  definition)  and  persons  who  live  alone  or with 
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ford a middle  class  style  of  living  as  we  had  come  to  define  it (Levy 
1988a, Chapter 4). Between  1973 and 1986, median  family income  grew 
from $28,890 to $30,670 (5% per decade) and it was this stagnation which 
helped  prompt  fears  of  a  vanishing  middle  class.  There  is  a  second 
element  to  fears  of  a vanishing  middle  class  involving  changes  in  the 
kinds  of families  that occupy  various  portions  of the  distribution.  I re- 
turn to this point  shortly. 
The relative stability of inequality is also suprising when  one considers 
post-World  War II population  trends.  In  the  late  1940s,  the  bottom 
quintile of the family income  distribution was dominated  by two kinds of 
families: elderly families (many of whom  still worked)  and farm families 
who  comprised  about  11% of  all families  and  who  typically  reported 
very  low  money  incomes.47 Since  that time,  rapid gains  in agricultural 
productivity have reduced the need for agricultural labor and the propor- 
tion of families in agriculture has declined  from 11% to 2%. At the same 
time,  successive  cohorts  of elderly  families have benefited  from greater 
Social Security  coverage,  indexed  Social Security payments  (after 1971) 
and greater private  pension  coverage.4  As  a result,  incomes  of elderly 
families over the last 15 years have grown more rapidly than the incomes 
of  non-elderly  families  (Council  of  Economic  Advisors  1985; see  also 
Table 9 below).  These  events,  cet. par., should  have  increased  family 
income  equality particularly after 1971 but, of course,  that did not occur. 
A partial explanation  for the trend in inequality since 1971 is contained 
in Table 9.  These  data show  that while  the incomes  of elderly  families 
were rising,  the number  of families headed  by single women  was grow- 
ing rapidly. Among  families  headed  by someone  under age 65, the pro- 
portion  headed  by a single  woman  rose from about one in eight in the 
early 1970s to one in five today, where in both years, the median incomes 
of  such  families  were  well  below  the  incomes  of other  families  in  the 
population.  The result  was  a kind  of "swap" in which  elderly  families 
were  moving  from the  bottom  of the  income  distribution  to the lower 
middle  while  their  "vacated  places"  at the bottom  were  taken by new 
female-headed  families with  children. 
I noted  above  that Census  data understate  the recent increase in fam- 
ily income  inequality.  The  data in Table 9 suggest  that such  increased 
inequality  as  the  Census  does  report  might  be  driven  by  changes  in 
family structure: the growing  number  of families who  are either headed 
47. Money  incomes  obviously  understate  the relative well-being  of many farm families but 
the  purpose  of  this  discussion  is to examine  trends  in reported  Census  (i.e.,  money 
income)  statistics. 
48. Peter Diamond  reminds  me that the incomes  of elderly families were further increased 
because  Social Security was  not only indexed  but over-indexed  for much of the 1970s. 104 *  LEVY 
by a single woman  or have two earners. The suggestion,  while plausible, 
is wrong.  Recent calculations  by Eugene  Smolensky  suggest  that wives' 
earnings  have  exerted  a moderating  influence  on  increased  household 
income inequality  (personal communication).  Growing numbers of fami- 
lies headed  by  single  women  are clearly important  in increased  family 
income  inequality  but the growing  inequality  of male earnings is impor- 
tant as well.  I return to this point in the next section. 
I also noted above that population  shifts within the income distribution 
add to perceptions  of a vanishing  middle class. In particular, the swap of 
female-headed  families for elderly families at the bottom of the distribu- 
tion  has  led  to a situation  in  which  income  inequality  among  families 
with children has increased  substantially  (Figure 7). We saw in Section 4 
that  part of  the  post-1973  increase  in  income  per  capita reflected  low 
national  birth  rates.  In  this  context,  a  growing  number  of  families 
headed  by women  led to an even more rapid growth in the proportion of 
children in female-headed  families: .10 of all children in 1973 to .20 of all 
children in 1986. The result has been  to increase the proportion  of chil- 
dren  in families  with  income  under  $10,000  (1987 dollars) from one  in 
nine in the early 1970s to one in six today. The growing  number of poor 
children is highly  visible  and newsworthy-as  it should  be. Specifically, 
poor children are more visible than the improved  incomes  of the elderly, 
and this leads to a perception  that income inequality is rising faster than 
the Census  statistics report. 
The  perception,  moreover,  may  contain  a kernel  of  truth.  If middle 
class  families  no  longer  drop  to the  bottom  of the income  distribution 
Table  9  FREQUENCY  AND MEDIAN  INCOME  OF MAJOR  FAMILY  TYPES, 
1973, 1986  (INCOMES  IN 1987  DOLLARS) 
1973  1986 
Family  Percent  of  Median  Percent  of  Median 
Type  All Families  Income  All Families  Income 
All  100%  $29,890  100%  $30,670 
Family  Head > Age 65*  14.3%  $15,956  15.8%  $20,752 
Hus.-Wife <65,  39.7%  $30,218  24.5%  $29,787 
Wife does not Work 
Hus.-Wife <65  33.6%  $37,158  42.3%  $38,750 
Wife Works 
Female  Fam. Head <65  10.3%  $13,424  14.4%  $11,308 
All other families  2.1%  3.0% 
*Includes both male and female headed  families over age 65. 
Source:  Current  Population Reports, various  issues.  Some medians  interpolated  from published  data. Recent  Trends  in U.S. Earnings  and  Family  Incomes  ' 105 
upon  retirement  and  if  low  income  female-headed  families  remain 
female-headed  families  for  long  periods  of  time  (Bane  and  Ellwood 
1986), it may be that mobility within the income distribution has declined 
over the last 15 years-that  a fairly stable distribution  of current family 
incomes  obscures  a growing  inequality  of permanent  family  incomes. 
This is a topic for future research. 
6. Earnings  Inequality  and  Income  Inequality 
To this  point,  I have  emphasized  inequality  that arises from between- 
group differences: mean differences in earnings between  high school and 
college  educated  workers,  mean  income  differences  between  female- 
headed  families  and  two-earner  families,  and  so  on.  In this  section,  I 
look  again  at  changes  in  family  income  inequality  from  a  somewhat 
broader perspective.  I showed  in Sections  1 and 3 that earnings of prime 
age men  have  also become  less  equal over 1973-86  and we  can reason- 
ably ask to what  extent  this  individual  earnings  inequality-a  growing 
within-group  difference-was  translated  into family income  inequality. 
In this  section,  I present  some  illustrative,  incomplete  calculations  on 
this question. 
I begin by reviewing  one version of the steps that link male earnings to 
family income.  For clarity, I focus on men ages 25-34. 
Figure  7 DISTRIBUTION  OF CHILDREN  BY  FAMILY  INCOME  1973, 1986 
Percent of Children 
40% 
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Income  Bracket 
In Female-Head  Fams.  /  All Other Children 
Source:  author's  tabulations  of CPS  micro  data  files. 
Income  in 1987  dollars.  Inflation-adjusted  using PCE  Index. 106 *  LEVY 
The process begins  with the distribution of earnings of all men,  ages 25- 
34, including  men who  have no earnings whatsoever.49 
The next step is the move  from the distribution of individual  earnings to 
the distribution  of individual  incomes  including  unemployment  com- 
pensation,  rents,  dividends,  and other income  sources as reported by 
the Census. 
The third step is the move  from the distribution of individual  incomes  of 
all 25-34  men  to the distribution  of individual  incomes  of 25-34-year- 
old husbands. 
The final step is the move  from the individual  incomes  of all 25-34-year- 
old  husbands  to the  family  incomes  of all 25-34-year-old  husbands. 
While  earnings  inequality  among  25-34-year-old  men  has  increased 
over time,  the last two  steps  of the sequence  have the potential  of mut- 
ing this inequality.  Andrew  Sum, among  other authors,  has shown  that 
the individual  incomes  of married men are higher, on average,  than the 
individual  incomes  of unmarried men with similar characteristics (Sum's 
work appears in Children's Defense  Fund 1988).50  It follows  that moving 
from  the  individual  incomes  of  all men  to  the  individual  incomes  of 
married men  (step 3) should  both raise mean income  and lower relative 
income  inequality.51 
In a similar fashion,  I have shown,  as have a number of other authors, 
that wives'  earnings increase the relative equality of income of husband- 
wife families  (Levy 1988, Chapter 8).52  It follows  that moving  from hus- 
bands'  individual  incomes  to the  total of their families  (step  4) should 
produce  a distribution  with a higher mean and lower relative inequality. 
The issue,  however,  is not just  the  direction  of these  effects  but the 
magnitudes  of the effects: to what extent were the effects able to reduce 
49. Men  without  earnings  were  excluded  from Figure 2 and  Tables 2 and  3 because  my 
focus  there  was  on  the  changing  nature  of employment.  Men  without  earnings  are 
included  here  because  they  are  potential  husbands  who  may  appear  in  the  family 
income  distribution. 
50. A priori, these  earnings  differences  could correspond  to either unmeasured  differences 
in ability or the  change  in outlook  brought  about by the responsibilities  of marriage. 
Attempts  to determine  the relative importance of these two factors have been generally 
unsuccessful. 
51. By relative income  inequality, I mean the coefficient of variation, the Gini index,  Atkin- 
son's  index,  etc. Absolute  inequality-e.g.,  the variance of income-may  well increase 
since husbands'  incomes  are higher,  on average,  than the incomes  of all men. 
52  This equality  comes  from  two  sources.  First, wives'  labor force participation  falls as 
husbands'  earnings  rise (though  this is becoming  less  true over time).  Second,  varia- 
tions  in working  wives'  earnings  is less  than the variation in husbands'  earnings.  The 
joint  result  is  that  the  wives'  percentage  contribution  to  family  income  declines  as 
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the amount of individual  earnings inequality that was passed  through to 
the family income  distribution. 
Some  rough  calculations  on this point  appear in Table 10 which  track 
the four steps  described  above for 25-34-year-old  men with four years of 
high  school,  25-34-year-old  men  with  four years of college,  and all 25- 
34-year-old men  (including  Ph.D.'s,  high school  dropouts,  etc.). 
The results  in the Table 10 support  two  general conclusions.  First, as 
we  move  from individual  earnings  to family income,  the processes  de- 
scribed  above  reduce  the  coefficient  of  variation  (c.o.v.)  by  a total  of 
about 20% (e.g.,  .518 versus  .429 for 25-34-year-old  high  school  men in 
1974), a result  that is consistent  across all groups  in the table. Second, 
the magnitudes  of these  percentage  reductions  were similar in 1974 and 
1986 and so the increased  earnings  inequality  of the period reappeared 
largely  intact  in  the  family  income  distribution.  For all 25-34-year-old 
men,  the c.o.v.  for individual  earnings  rose from .603 in 1973 to .736 in 
1986 (+22%)  while  the  c.o.v.  for family  income  rose  from  .476 to  .594 
(+.25%).  Thus  increased  earnings  inequality  among  men  did  have  an 
impact on increased  family income  inequality. 
The stable  proportional  reductions  in inequality  are surprising  given 
the way  in which  marital patterns  changed  over the period.  The rising 
age  of  first  marriage  (noted  in  Section  4)  and  related  developments 
sharply  reduced  the  proportion  of 25-34-year-old  men  who  were  hus- 
bands.  A priori,  marriage might  have  increasingly  acted to screen  low 
income  men out of the family income  distribution.  In practice, declining 
marriage rates were  uniform  across educational  groups  and the screen- 
ing  did  not  occur.  Among  25-34-year-old  husbands  with  a high  school 
diploma,  mean  individual  income  fell from $26,262 in  1973 to $21,752 
(-17%).  Among  25-34-year-old  husbands  with  four  years  of  college, 
mean individual  income  rose slightly  over the period.  In both cases,  the 
changes  in mean husbands'  incomes  parallel the changes  in mean earn- 
ings  for all men  of similar characteristics (married or not).  Thus among 
families  headed  by  25-34-year-old  high  school  graduates,  increased 
wives'  earnings  were  needed  to maintain  1986 family income  at its 1973 
level.  Among  families  headed  by 25-34-year-old  college  graduates,  in- 
creased wives'  earnings  caused  family income  to rise by about 14% over 
the period. 
It should  be noted  that the calculations in Table 10 are only one of two 
mechanisms  in which  male earnings  trends may have influenced  family 
income  inequality.  The other mechanism  is the  postulated  relationship 
between  low  men's  earnings  and the formation of female-headed  fami- 
lies per se.  A chief proponent  of this view  is William Julius Wilson who Table 10  THE TRANSLATION  OF 25-34-YEAR-OLD  MEN'S EARNINGS INTO FAMILY INCOME (1987 DOLLARS) 
25-43-Year Old Men with 12 Yrs. of Ed. 
1973  1986 
Coef.  Coef. 
Cohort  of.  % chng.  Cohort  of  %chng. 
(%chng)  Mean  var.  in c.o.v.  (%chng.)  Mean  var.  in c.o.v. 
All Indiv. Earnings  5.4m.  $24,153  .518  -  8.5m.  $18,664  .653 
(-)  (-) 
All Indiv. Income.  5.4m  $24,729  .503  -2.9%  8.5m.  $19,430  .632  -.9% 
(-)  (-) 
Hsbnds'  Indiv.  Income  4.3m.  $26,262  .457  -9.1%  4.8m.  $21,752  .574  -9.1 
(-20.4%)  (-43.6%) 
Hsbnds'  Family Income  4.3m.  $31,376  .429  -6.1%  4.8m.  $31,034  .524  -9.1% 
(-)  (-) 
25-34  Year  Old Men with 16 Yrs. of Ed. 
1973  1986 
Coef.  Coef. 
Cohort  of.  % chng.  Cohort  of  %chng. 
(% chng.)  Mean  var.  in c.o.v.  (%chng.)  Mean  var.  in c.o.v. 
All Indiv. Earnings  1.8m  $27,413  .568  -  5.3m.  $28,165  .622 
(-)  (-) 
All Indiv. Income.  1.8m.  $30,357  .569  +.1  5.3m.  $30,299  .612  -1.7% 
(-)  (-) 
Hsbnds'  Indiv.  Income  1.4m.  $32,827  .523  -8.1%  2.7m.  $33,281  .552  -8.9% 
(-22.2%)  (-49.1%) 
Hsbnds'  Family Income  1.4m.  $40,763  .455  -13.1%  2.7m.  $46,402  .504  -8.7% 
(-)  (-) All 25-34  Year Old Men. (includes all educational  levels) 
1973  1986 
Coef.  Coef. 
Cohort  of.  % chng.  Cohort  of  %chng. 
(% chng.)  Mean  var.  in c.o.v.  (%chng.)  Mean  var.  in c.o.v. 
All Indiv. Earnings  14.2m.  $24,282  .603  -  21.1m.  $20,981  .736 
(-)  (-) 
All Indiv. Income.  14.2m.  $25,061  .583  -3.4%  21.1m.  $21,905  .710  -3.6% 
(-)  (-) 
Hsbnds'  Indiv.  Income  10.9m.  $27,038  .522  -10.5%  11.9m.  $24,620  .643  -9.9% 
(-23.7%)  (-43.6%) 
Hsbnds'  Family Income  10.9m.  $33,081  .476  -8.6%  11.9m.  $34,293  .594  -7.7% 
(-)  (-)  _______ 
Note:  %  change in cohort refers to the percent  reduction  from the previous step. Percent  in c.o.v. refers  to the percent  change in the coefficient  of variation 
from  the previous step. 
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argues  that  the  prominence  of  female-headed  families  among  blacks 
reflects a pool of black "marriageable men" that has been sharply limited 
by unemployment  and low  earnings  (as well as incarceration and homi- 
cide).  Wilson  offers some  suggestive  evidence  on this proposition  (Wil- 
son 1988) while  other attempts  to test the proposition  do not reach clear 
conclusions  (e.g.,  Bassi 1987). 
7. Conclusion 
It is sometimes  argued that the income  distribution is the preoccupation 
of intellectuals:  the population  at large does  not care about it, and if the 
government  cares about it, it should  not  since  it will only  make things 
worse.53 People  can argue about the normative content  of this view, but 
as a description  of behavior,  it is increasingly  incorrect. In recent years, 
the distributions  of U.S.  earnings  and family incomes  have increasingly 
been  the subject of public discussion.  There are, I believe,  two reasons 
why  this trend will continue.  The first reason involves  the ramifications 
of continued  slow  growth  of individual  incomes  (should growth,  in fact, 
remain  slow).  With  the  conspicuous  exception  of  Social  Security,  the 
U.S.  has  not engaged  in significant  income  redistribution  to reduce  in- 
equality. Rather, we  have  relied  on rapid economic  growth  to improve 
living  standards  across  the  board.  This  is  a sensible  enough  strategy 
when  growth  is strong but it leaves us vulnerable when  growth is weak. 
Today, for example,  something  like half of all 25-34-year-old  men have a 
high school  diploma  or less.  If this group has greatly difficulty in buying 
single  family  homes-in  particular,  more  difficulty  than  their  fathers 
had-this  economic  issue  will surely become  a political issue  as well. 
The second  reason  for predicting  continued  attention  is the growing 
bi-modality  in the distribution  of children's families' incomes  (Figure 7). 
Through much  of the  1970s, the labor force was growing  at 2-2.5%  per 
year and labor with  weak  skills could  simply  be disregarded.  Over the 
next decade,  the labor force will be growing  at 1-1.5%  a year and labor 
will become  a relatively  scarce commodity.  It is very hard to predict the 
required skill distribution  of future occupations,  but it is plausible  that 
many occupations  will require more skills in the future than they did in 
the  past.  A  number  of  recent  newspaper  articles and  anecdotes  have 
described  the  growth  of  applicant  testing  for  automobile  production 
workers  (particularly at U.S.-Japanese  joint ventures),  telephone  opera- 
tors, and other "good high  school  jobs" (Levy and Murnane,  forthcom- 
53. This spirit  is captured  in  Irving  Kristol's comment  on  Alan  Blinder's  1980 review  of 
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ing).  In this context,  the growing  proportion  of children in homes  with 
incomes  less  than $10,000 is not a good  sign.  Sarah McLanahan (1985), 
among others,  has demonstrated  that coming from a low income,  female 
headed  family  sharply  increases  the  probability  of  not  finishing  high 
school for both whites  and blacks. The implications of this situation have 
already stimulated  both substantial public discussion  and growing  busi- 
ness  interest in assisting  local school  systems.54 A decade ago, when  the 
labor  force  was  increasing  at  2-3%  per  year,  such  cooperation  was 
largely unknown. 
In sum,  issues  of inequality  are very much  today in the public eye.  I 
believe  they have reached that position  as much from a failure of growth 
as from increased  inequality  per se.  But whatever  their origins,  the is- 
sues will be with  us for the foreseeable  future. 
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Comment 
LAWRENCE  H. SUMMERS 
Frank Levy's  impressive  paper  is  largely  about  the  535 electoral  vote 
question  of whether  peoples  are better off today than they were 16 years 
ago,  or even  8 years ago.  Levy's verdict is fairly negative,  and is all the 
more worrisome  because  it reflects extensive  and thorough  contact with 
the data.  The American  people  gave  an answer  to that question  in the 
November  1988  election-a  somewhat  more  optimistic  answer  than 
Levy  provides  in  his  paper.  Some  of my  friends  and  I wish  we  knew 
why. I can however  offer some  observations  on Levy's analysis. 
First, have  living  standards  really  stagnated  as badly  as  the  official 
statistics Levy relies on suggest?  There is a kind of disjunction in profes- 
sional discussions.  Had this been a paper called "The Productivity Slow- 
down"  and  had  it  been  claimed  that  productivity  had  been  growing 
rapidly  up  until  1973 and  stopped  growing  rapidly thereafter, lengthy 
discussion  of whether  the productivity  statistics are right would  ensue. 
The issues  of whether  we  measure  the  quality  of goods  appropriately 
and whether  we measure improvements  in the service sector at an appro- 
priate rate would  be debated.  Such issues  are not usually aired when  the 
subject  is  the  behavior  of  real wages  or family  incomes.  Yet, they  are 
equally fundamental  even  when  productivity  is not the proximate issue. 
The same price deflators  that need  to adequately  treat quality change  in 
evaluating  productivity  performance  are also crucial components  of the 
price indexes  used  to study  trends  in real wages  or family incomes.  To 
whatever  extent quality measurement  issues  are important in discussing 
productivity, they are equally important in discussing  stagnation in mea- 
sured real income  growth. 
Think of some  examples.  You can get money  from your bank at mid- 
night,  when  once you could not. You can get a boarding pass before you 
fly. Perhaps more consequentially,  in a world where  the average Ameri- 
can family has a TV set on for 50 hours each week,  you can now  choose 
from 90 TV channels,  and you used  to be able to choose  from only three 
or four. You can cook in your microwave.  Your supermarket has twice as 
many goods  to choose  from as it did fifteen years ago. It is probably true 
that none  of those  developments  are reflected to an appreciable extent in 
our measure  of increases  in standard of living,  and for that reason,  the 
thesis  of stagnation  is overstated; 
How  serious  are these  biases?  It is very  hard to get  a sense  of what 
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types  of developments  that I have been  describing have been universal, 
taking place around  the world.  If you  use  the numbers  we  convention- 
ally  use-the  conventional  time  series  numbers  of  productivity  or on 
quality-and  you make international comparisons,  what you conclude is 
that the standard of living  in Britain or Japan today is roughly  compara- 
ble to standards  of living in the United States at the end of World War II 
in the case  of Britain and in the early 1950s in the case of Japan. If you 
think this is true,  then  it follows  that you  arrive at the conclusion  that 
this quality problem is not serious.  If you think that life in Japan is rather 
better than life in the United  States in the early 1950s, you are drawn to 
conclude  that  our  statistics  in  the  United  States  have  understated  the 
growth  in standards  of living  over time.  I think that is almost certainly 
the case. 
Whether or not that any of this explains  the productivity  slowdown  is 
of course a very different question.  While I can not produce as good a list 
of new  innovations  that took  place between  1960 and  1973 that would 
have  increased  standards  of living  as I can between  1973 and the pres- 
ent, I suspect  that has more to do with the fact that I was six years old in 
1960 than  it does  with  those  innovations  not  having  taken  place.  On 
balance,  I think  there  are  strong  reasons  to  believe  that  real income 
growth  is  greater  in  the  United  States  than  official  statistics  suggest. 
Whether official statistics  correctly portray its deterioration is much less 
obvious. 
Second,  I think  that  the  political  and  the  op-ed  discussions  of  stan- 
dards of living issue have introduced  two sets of verbiage into the discus- 
sion of the change  in the distribution of standards of living which are not 
helpful.  I would  have  liked to see  Levy go after these  ideas more force- 
fully. One is the notion  of the vanishing  middle  class.  One might think, 
having  heard that the middle  class had disappeared  or had diminished 
or was  vanishing,  that there  would  be  some  distribution  of something 
relevant  that  would  be  bimodal.  But  this  is  not  the  case.  All  of  the 
distributions-skill,  wages,  income,  everything  under  discussion  in 
Levy's  paper-are  not  bimodal.  They  are  single  peaked.  That  single 
peak is very near their middle.  That was  true, and continues  to be true. 
Discussions  of the disappearance  of the middle  class have more to do 
with  the  way  in which  we  define  the  middle  than it does  with  factors 
that are more  economically  meaningful.  This is not  to deny  that there 
have  been  increases  in inequality,  but I think discussing  them  in terms 
of  a  declining  middle  class  is  unhelpful.  It leads  to  the  rather sorry 
spectacle  of  debates  between  the Wall Street Journal and  The New York 
Times over  whether  the  middle  class  has  diminished  because  of  an 
increase  in the  size  of the  upper  class  or an increase  in the  size  of the 116 *  SUMMERS 
lower  class.  Given  the likelihood  that 20 percent  of the population  will 
continue  to  be  in  the  top  fifth  of  income  distribution,  this  type  of 
discussion  is less  than fruitful. 
I am  also  skeptical,  though  to  a slightly  lesser  degree,  about  those 
discussions  of  living  standards  that  focus  on  the  "good  jobs" versus 
"bad jobs" distinction.  Real wages  in all jobs have increased much more 
slowly  since  1973 than  they  had  prior to 1973. There have  been  move- 
ments  in the employment  structure which  have  moved  to some  extent 
between  higher wage jobs and lower wage jobs, but those are very much 
second  order relative to the common  movement  in all jobs. 
Furthermore,  there is a minimal  need  to determine  how  much of any 
change that has taken place in the distribution of good and bad jobs, and 
what this has to do with  the change  in the distribution of good  and bad 
workers  as  opposed  to  good  and  bad  jobs.  If, as  in  recent  work  on 
industry  wage  differentials,  an effort is made  to control for differences 
between  jobs  in worker  characteristics and  to isolate  something  that is 
maybe a pure characteristic of jobs, the significance of the movements  in 
the income  distribution  that are due  to movements  between  good  and 
bad jobs is substantially  reduced. 
My third observation  is that it is time for the literature on the changing 
American wage  structure to move  from description  toward explanation. 
Levy's paper is entirely persuasive  (subject to the measurement  qualifica- 
tion  noted  above)  on  the  point  that wage  growth  has  slowed  and  that 
more skilled workers have gained  at the expense  of less skilled workers. 
Forecasts of the future and judgments  about policy depend  on the expla- 
nation of these  phenomena. 
I would  distinguish  two hypotheses  which I hope will be contrasted in 
future wage  structure  research.  The macroeconomic  hypothesis  links in- 
creasing  inequality  and  to some  extent  slow  wage  growth  to transitory 
macroeconomic  developments.  It is a very optimistic viewpoint.  Accord- 
ing  to  the  macroeconomic  view,  macroeconomic  policies  that  have 
pushed  the dollar up in the early 1980s and led to deindustrialization  are 
the culprit. This view  paints a bright picture for the 1990s. 
It is a near certainty that the rest of the world will not continue loaning 
us  money  at current  rates,  so  the  trade deficit  will  have  to fall.  Since 
manufacturing  accounts  for 80 percent  of U.S.  trade, this portends  the 
reindustrialization  of  America.  Recognizing  that  our  trade  deficit  is 
nearly  3 percent  of  GNP  and  that  some  deterioration  in  our terms  of 
trade is nearly inevitable,  it is hard to escape  the conclusion  that manu- 
facturing  as a share  of GNP  will  have  to raise by 3 to 4 percent  in the 
1990s. For this  to happen  by  1995, manufacturing  would  have  to grow 
more than twice  as rapidly as the aggregate  economy  over the next five Comment 117 
years and the share of manufacturing  in the American economy  would 
have to reach a record level. 
The reindustrialization  of America would  create opportunities  for the 
kinds of workers who  were displaced  during the early 1980s, and would 
no  doubt  increase  the  demand  for  brawn  relative  to  brains.  If  the 
macroeconomic  disturbances  of the 1980s caused  increases  in inequality 
during  the  last  decade,  then  the  1990s will  see  inequality  come  down. 
A different  macroeconomic  determinant  of the wage  structure is the 
degree  of pressure  in labor markets.  Observing  what we  pay our clean- 
ing woman,  I cannot help but think that in an economy  that has very low 
unemployment,  in an economy  where  for some  set of macroeconomic 
reasons  there  is  a  shortage  of  labor,  the  return  to  unskilled  labor in- 
creases  quite rapidly. The average  unemployment  rate over the 16 year 
period since  1973 has been considerably  greater than the average unem- 
ployment  rate in the sixteen  years preceding  1973. The post-1973 period 
has  seen  two  very  serious  recessions,  and I wonder  whether  that does 
not  have  something  to  do  with  the  change  in  the  return  to  different 
types  of workers  that Levy discusses  in his paper. 
Some  variant on the  macroeconomic  hypothesis  is relatively conven- 
tional wisdom.  The alternative hypothesis,  which is vigorously  urged by 
Robert Reich,  Barry Bluestone,  Bennett  Harrison,  and  some  other pro- 
gressive  critics of mainstream  economic  thinking,  stresses  structural  de- 
terminants  of the  wage  structure.  This view  is less  optimistic  than  the 
macroeconomic  viewpoint  since it highlights  changes  in the world econ- 
omy that will not be reversed  as the U.S.  trade deficit diminishes. 
Three structural stories  can plausibly  be linked  to the changing  wage 
structure.  First,  the  combination  of  continuing  political  harmony  and 
technical  change  are integrating  the  world  economy  at a rapid rate- 
witness  the doubling  in the share of trade in the U.S. economy  over the 
last  30 years.  Trade theory  teaches  us  that  trade  in  goods  and  factor 
mobility are substitutes.  The rest of the world is longer on brawn than on 
brains  and  longer  on  unskilled  workers  than  on  skilled  workers.  It 
stands  to  reason  that  increased  trade  volumes  will  therefore  benefit 
skilled  workers  at  the  expense  of  unskilled  workers.  This  is  not  just 
theory.  My  recent  work  with  Larry Katz (1989) demonstrates  that the 
workers  in U.S.  export  industries  are more  skilled and paid more than 
workers in U.S. import industries. 
This story clearly works in the right direction for explaining  increased 
inequality. It also suggests  no respite in the years to come.  The question 
is  whether  it  is  quantitatively  important  enough  to  account  for  the 
change  in inequality  given  that trade is still relatively small compared to 
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A  second  structural  explanation  for increasing  inequality  is  that the 
impact  of  technological  changes  such  as  computerization  has  been  to 
increase  the return to being  skillful.  A single  consultant  can visit many 
more companies  in a year than  was  once  the case.  Managers  can now 
dispense  with  support  staffs  when  computers  can collate  and  process 
data.  As  product  variety  increases,  the  return  to  a  salesman's  being 
smart  as  well  as  personable  is  increased.  Such  effects  are difficult  to 
quantify,  but  may  nonetheless  be  important  to  determining  the  wage 
structure. 
There is a third structural explanation  for increasing  inequality-one 
that is very  difficult  to test.  It may be that as the world  has become  a 
tougher,  more  competitive  place,  horizontal  equity  norms  have  given 
way  to  more  ruthless  systems  of  pay  for  performance.  This  may  be 
because  relatively  egalitarian  wage  structures  are luxuries  that can no 
longer  be  afforded.  Or it may  be because  the importance  of providing 
workers with  incentives  to do a good  job has increased.  Consider  some 
examples.  Companies  are  starting  to  make  much  more  use  of  profit- 
sharing and bonuses.  Law firms are increasingly  compensating  partners 
on  the  basis  of  performance,  not  seniority.  And  companies  are being 
much  more  ruthless  about  eliminating  redundant  middle  managers. 
This  trend,  like  the  other  structural factors I have  cited,  is unlikely  to 
reverse itself. 
Is the  macroeconomic  or the  structural view  of increasing  inequality 
correct? I am  not  sure.  The  structural  arguments  strike  me  as  more 
compelling  than  the  macroeconomic  ones.  On  the  other  hand,  many 
more structural breaks with our economic  past are proclaimed than actu- 
ally take place.  Only  time and future research (in that order I fear) will 
resolve  the issue. 
Let me turn finally to the two policy inferences  that are drawn by Levy 
in his conclusions.  The first is that if we  are no longer  growing  we  will 
have  to  worry  more  about  redistribution.  The  exact  meaning  of  the 
phrase  "we  will  have  to" is  not  clear.  I would  guess  as  a  predictive 
theory  that  if we  are not  growing  it will  make  us  less  likely  to worry 
about  redistribution  rather than  more  likely.  Generosity  is almost  cer- 
tainly a luxury good.  It is not an accident that the Great Society emerged 
in the 1960s, at the tail end  of a boom,  supported  by projections of very 
generous  growth  that made  it look  like you  could  do  almost  anything 
and have it cost a relatively modest  amount. 
If we are to grow  slowly,  and if it is to be the case that the least skilled 
one-third  of the population  will have  a difficult time earning a substan- 
tial income,  redistribution  on  a scale where  it will reach everyone  who 
does  not  go  to college,  or will  reach half the  people  who  do  not  go  to Discussion  *  119 
college,  strikes me a being an exceedingly  unlikely political and undesir- 
able  economic  prospect.  The  more  direct  and  appropriate  policy  re- 
sponse  to tough  times  and  widening  inequality  would  not  involve  in- 
come redistribution  so much as it would  involve  doing things that would 
affect the  distribution  of  skills  and  doing  things  that would  prepare a 
larger share of the population  for better jobs. 
Levy  concludes  by  talking  about  what  all  this  means  for children, 
emphasizing  the  specter  of  poor  children  falling  further  and  further 
behind.  He may be right, but I would  say the evidentiary  content of this 
part of his paper is rather low. First of all, even  granting that children in 
poor  families  do  worse  than  children  who  come  from  more  affluent 
families,  it does  not follow  that transfering income  to the poor families 
and  making  them  no  longer  poor  will  solve  whatever  is giving  rise to 
that correlation.  That  does  not  follow  and  is  not  really argued  in  the 
paper. Without  knowing  what  it is that has taken place that has caused 
the  changes  in  the  income  distribution  of  children,  one  cannot  really 
support the conclusion  that more income redistribution will equalize the 
distribution of skills among  the nation's  children. 
Furthermore,  I suspect  that in  order  to really understand  what  has 
happened  to the distribution of income among children, one would have 
to pay more attention  than the paper does  to changes  in the patterns of 
fertility across different  groups  in the population.  The fact is that, con- 
trary to myth,  the number of children being born under the poverty line 
or near the poverty  line has not increased  during the 1970s. A large part 
of what has happened  is that fertility has just collapsed  among those  far 
above  the  poverty  line.  That is responsible  for some  significant  part of 
the increase in the fraction of kids below  the poverty  line. 
Frank Levy's paper has done  an excellent job of describing the Ameri- 
can economy's  most  serious  problems.  I hope  and trust that his future 
research and that of others will go further and point toward explanations 
for the unfortunate  trends  he describes.  Only  after sound  explanations 
have been  provided  will one  be in a position  to offer convincing  policy 
recommendations. 
Discussion 
Robert Hall felt that Levy's  evidence  indicated  that the US economy  is 
becoming  more  meritocratic.  Though  dropouts  are  important  at  the 
lower end of the income  distribution,  Hall speculated  that the rest of the 
income  distribution  was  largely  determined  by ability. Levy responded 
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have been  provided  will one  be in a position  to offer convincing  policy 
recommendations. 
Discussion 
Robert Hall felt that Levy's  evidence  indicated  that the US economy  is 
becoming  more  meritocratic.  Though  dropouts  are  important  at  the 
lower end of the income  distribution,  Hall speculated  that the rest of the 
income  distribution  was  largely  determined  by ability. Levy responded 120 *  DISCUSSION 
that it was  important  to keep  in mind  the large distributional  effects  of 
macroeconomic  events  such  as the  large trade deficits.  Murphy  added 
that while  changes  in wages  are in part due to changes  in the supply  of 
labor, the most important factor in changing  wage  distributions,  particu- 
larly among the poor, is changing  labor demand.  This is reflected particu- 
larly in the return to higher education. 
Robert Gordon took issue  with Summers'  skepticism about the degree 
of  nominal  wage  rigidity.  If jobs  are changing  through  time,  average 
wages  will  change  even  if  no  individual  wages  change.  Gordon  also 
wondered  whether  today's  high  pressure  economy,  with  its increased 
demand  for high-wage  manufacturing  goods  will help the poor as much 
as past  expansions,  based  more  on  low-wage  output.  Finally, Gordon 
suggested  that  income  distribution  may  be  determined  more  by  the 
compensation  institutions  in a country than by any sense  of meritocracy, 
citing the tighter Japanese distribution  over the US one.  Hall responded 
that the  United  States  has  a more  diverse  population  than many  other 
countries  so that it was  not right to compare income  distributions. 
William Nordhaus  found  puzzling  Murphy's  evidence  that wages  for 
older  workers  seem  more  flexible  than  wages  for  younger  workers. 
William Brainard suggested  that this may be due to differences in work- 
ing  positions  for the  two  groups.  Nordhaus  also indicated  that college 
admission  was  still largely restricted to the upper income  distributions, 
suggesting  that  family  characteristics  may  be  as important  as merit in 
advancement. 
Mark Bils  suggested  that  Levy  control  for cost  of  living  changes  in 
different regions  of the country. Levy indicated  that this was  difficult to 
do because  the cost of living varied even  within  regions. 
Levy  concluded  by  emphasizing  that  aggregate  wage  stagnation 
makes  relative  income  changes  more  important  than  they  are  when 
wages  are growing,  and that just as it is difficult to explain the productiv- 
ity  slowdown  with  changes  in  the  quality  of  output,  it is  difficult  to 
believe  that people  are better off because  of an increased  quality of the 
goods  they purchase. 